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NOTES
VALIDITY OF PREVAILING MINIMUM WAGE DETERMINATION
UNDER THE PUBLIC CONTRACTS ACT*
PRIOR to the passage of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act,1 the
Federal Government discouraged the improvement of labor standards in work
on its supply contracts by a statutory requirement that such contracts be
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.2 To make, an attractive offer, eager
bidders drove down labor costs; employers who disdained such practices
frequently could not qualify. Embarrassed by the fact that it was encouraging
wage "chiseling" on public contracts,3 Congress provided in the Walsh-Healey
Act that Government supply contracts should contain a stipulation by the
contractor that all persons employed in the performance of the contract
would be paid not less than the prevailing minimum wage.
4
The determination of the rate of pay to be considered as the prevailing
minimum wage is left to the Secretary of Labor, who administers the Act
with the assistance of the Public Contracts Board. Investigations and findings
concerning wage rates are made by the Board and submitted as a recom-
mendation to the Secretary of Labor for final determination. The alternative
standards to be used in ascertaining the wages are set forth in the Act:
. . the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar
work or in the particular or similar industries or groups of industries operat-
ing in the locality in which the . . .supplies . . . are to be manufactured
or furnished." The Act neither defines "locality" nor presents a guide for
*Lukens Steel Co., et at. v. Perkins, et al., No. 7368, (1939) 2 WAGE & HouR REP.
index p. 443 (App. D. C. 1939).
1. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §§ 35-45 (Supp. 1938).
2. REV. STAT. § 3709 (1861), 41 U. S. C. § 5 (1934). The statute provides only that
purchases and contracts for supplies and services shall be made by advertising. Judicial and
executive construction have created the lowest responsible bidder requirement. The pur-
pose of advertising is to secure competition so the Government may purchase at the lowest
prices. Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909) ; Schneider v. United States, 19 Ct.
Cl. 547 (1884); 22 Ops. ATT'y GE.N. 1 (1897). See Legis. (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
297, 298.
3. This situation became particularly acute immediately following the invalidation
of the N.R.A. in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). The
Government was forced to deal with contractors who had abandoned the Code standards
for working conditions. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on H. R. ix554, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 121 et seq. Contracting officers
were compelled to accept the proposals from "bid-brokers" who would farm the contract
out to the next highest bidder. The latter reduced wages to make profitable operations
possible. Id. at 175, 208.
4. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 35 b (Supp. 1938). For a detailed analysis
of both the legislative history of the Act, and of the standard of a prevailing minimum
wage, see Comment, The Determination of Prevailing Minimiun Wages under the Public
Contracts Act (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 610.
5. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 35 b (Supp. 1938).
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interpreting these standards. Presumably, therefore, the interpretation is to
be left to the Secretary's discretion. The patent ambiguities in the statute
seem to permit at least three different constructions. "In the locality" may
modify only the last three standards, since the standard of "similar work"
may be regarded as one which could not "operate" within a geographic area;
or "in the locality" may qualify only its immediate precedent, "groups of in-
dustries ;" or "in the locality" may be a general qualification of all the stand-
ards in the Act. The Secretary has regularly chosen the last alternative, that
of general qualification, although actually only two of the standards- those
of the particular or similar industries - have ever been used.0 In applying
these standards to given industries, the Secretary has adopted a broad defini-
tion of "locality," regarding it as a large geographic area, usually embracing
several contiguous states, which has a uniform prevailing wage distinctly
higher or lower than that of other sizeable areas.7 In only seven of the thirty-
three industries for which determinations have been made were geographic
differentials recognized at all, and then the areas of uniform wages were of
such magnitude that within an industry differentials were few.8 The Secretary
has established a single wage rate in the remaining twenty-six industries
where no uniform and substantial differential was found to exst.
The determination for the iron and steel industry,10 which divides the
United States into six large "localities" for the purpose of establishing geo-
graphic differentials, is the first to be attacked in the courts."1 The com-
plainants are small steel companies in eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Connecticut whose wage rates are below the prevailing rate in the "Pittsburgh
District," and are included in one "locality" with the "Pittsburgh District."
The prevailing minimum wage established for this "locality" is the predom-
inant rate of the "Pittsburgh District." Claiming that the expansion of
"locality" to include great regional areas and the gerrymandering nature of
6. See Comment (1939) 48 YAiL L. J. 610, 615. The recommendations of the Public
Contracts Board to the Secretary of Labor in respect to the prevailing minimum wages
in the iron and steel industry will be cited simply as Recommendations. Final determina-
tions of the prevailing minimum wage by the Secretary of Labor in respect to a particular
industry will be cited as In re . . . Industry.
7. See Comment (1939) 4S Y.A=. L. J. 610, 624-628.
S. One industry is divided into four localities-the smallest 'locality" covers three
states. In re Fertilizer Industry, 3 FrD. REPG. 3S04 (1939). In each of three industries
the United States is portioned into three localities. In re Paper and Pulp Industry 4 F m.
Rm. 4120 (1939); In re Dimension Granite Industry, 2 Fa. R.E. 2976 (1937); In re
Furniture Mfg. Industry, 4 FaD. Rao. 1915 (1939). And for tw,.o industries, the differ-
ential separates two localities. In re Luggage and Saddlery Industries, 3 FED. Rm. 1733
(1938) ; In re 'Men's Underwear Industry, 2 FEa. Rxo. 1337 (1937).
9. Industries for which determinations have been promulgated form a good cro_ s-
section of the country's industrial pattern. Among some of the first industries were those
that were notorious for their sweat-shop conditions. See, i.e., In re Cotton Garment and
Allied Industries, 2 Fan. Rm. 1333 (1937); In re fen's Work Clothing Industry, 2 Fe.
RFG. 223 (1937) ; In re Work Glove Industry, 2 FED. REG. 1339 (1937).
10. In re Iron and Steel Industry, 4 FED. Pm. 265 ct seq. (1939).
11. Lukens Steel Co., et aL v. Perkins, ct aL. No. 7368 (1939) 2 AV. & H. R-p. in-
dex p. 443 (App. D. C. 1939).
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the determination are arbitrary and capricious abuses of authority by the
Secretary, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of the determination
and to have it declared void.1 2 The Secretary defends on the grounds, inter
alia, that the determination is a valid exercise of discretion; that the action
is against the United States without its consent; and that the plaintiffs have
no standing to sue, since no legal right is injured by the determination. The
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, but this
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held against the Secre-
tary on all contentions. An injunction was thereupon granted restraining
the enforcement of the determination against all members of the iron and
steel industry.13
The court states that the Secretary's determination is an abuse of authority
because by "locality" Congress meant no more than a "local center of man-
ufacture."' 4 Support for this conclusion is reached chiefly by a resort to
common usage of "locality." The court further states that since the statute
is clear and unambiguous, the Secretary's interpretation is outside the bounds
of administrative discretion. Because such reasoning nullifies not only the
particular determination for the iron and steel industry, but make vulnerable
to a similar challenge every other wage determination under the Act, the
effects of the decision are far-reaching. The decision also squarely presents
for the first time the question whether a prevailing minimum wage determina-
tion under the Walsh-Healey Act can be successfully challenged in the courts.
The court in the instant case tears the term "locality" from the context of
the Act. The statute should be interpreted to facilitate its obvious aims10
to raise the level of sub-standard labor conditions of workers on government
contracts and to prevent competition among government contractors from
becoming a force compelling the reduction of wages.' 0 The court's definition
12. Prior to the Act these companies had received substantial awards of Government
contracts. Record, pp. 4-7, Lukens Steel, et al. v. Perkins, et al., No. 7368, (1939) 2 W.
& H. REP. index p. 443 (App. D. C. 1939). Subsequent to the Lukens Steel decision the
plaintiffs have again made contracts with the Government for iron and steel commodities.
Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL by counsel for plaintiffs, Nov. 30, 1939.
13. If the court enjoined enforcement of the determination only as against the par-
ties, the plaintiffs would be able to secure contracts with different stipulations thatn the
contracts of competitors who were not parties to the suit. Such inequality would make
any contracts the plaintiffs might obtain of doubtful validity.
14. Lukens Steel Co., et al. v. Perkins, et al., No. 7368, Preliminary Opinion, p. 5.
The court concedes that the meaning of "locality" is somewhat indefinite, but states that
the Secretary's interpretation goes beyond any possible proper application of the word.
It is implicit within the decision that "in the locality" qualifies all standards for wage de-
terminations.
15. Cf. Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 165, 169
(1933) ; United States ex rel. Anderson v. Anderson, 76 F. (2d) 375, 378 (C. C. A. 8th,
1935).
16. See Hearings before Subcommittee of House on Judiciary on H. R. 11554, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 222-224 (statement by Secretary of Labor Perkins); 80 CONG.
REc. 10002 (1936) (statement by Representative Healey); SRACxnEiN, TnE PREVAIL-
ING MINIMu WAGE STANDARD (1939) 32-35; Comment (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 610, 611;
Legis. (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 102, 104-106.
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of "locality" discloses either a failure to recognize the purpose of the Act
or an unrealistic conception of the steel industry. The Public Contracts
Board does not establish a hypothetically fair wage but adopts the existing
predominate minimum wages in the particular industry.17 Consequently, the
prevailing minimum wage is a flexible rate controlled from within the in-
dustry. Under the court's interpretation, when there is only one possible
bidder in a local center of manufacture, as is the case in a majority of the
steel plants in the United States,18 he would be able to determine his own
prevailing minimum wages.10 Further, no effect vould be given to the fact
that lower wage rates give a manufacturer or manufacturers in one section
an important competitive advantage over manufacturers in distant sections
with higher rates.20 The result is that many employers, who might pay
higher wages, will drive down labor costs to meet their competition. The
restricted definition of "locality" in the Lukens Steel decision is thus objec-
tionable, since it preserves the status quo of manufacturers in geographically
isolated centers, permits the destructive competition to continue as a depres-
sant on labor conditions, and, consequently, impairs the corrective purposes
of the Act. On the other hand, these purposes are achieved by the Secretary's
interpretations. The prevailing minimum wage level of the entire industry,
with geographic differentials when desirable, eliminates sub-standard wage
practices by government contractors, and denies any unfair competitive
advantage that may result from low wage costs.
17. The sources of the statistics collected by the Board show that ,age rates relevant
to standards of "similar work" or "groups of industries" have not been considered;
"similar industries" has been used in but few instances. These standards were rejected
because a comparison of one work with "similar work" or one industry with a "similar
industry" or "groups of industries" presents severe practical obstacles; the results .ould
also be highly speculative since satisfactory similarities are difficult to ascertain. The
Act's purpose is not fully served by a comparison of non-competitive manufacturers. Sco
STRACKBEIx, op. cit. supra note 16, at 40-6S.
18. 234 iron and steel plants furnished testimony before the Public Contracts Boiard.
Approximately 130 of these plants are in local centers of manufacture. Recommendations
(1938) 68, 69, 78-84.
19. E.g.,-the situation in New Jersey will exemplify this problem. There are three
distinct centers of manufacturers in the state. One center pays a base rate of 561c. (two
plants) ; a second district pays a base rate of 62', c. (one plant) ; the third center (one
plant) pays a base rate of 50c. Recommendations 44, 45 (1938). These centers obviously
would be unaffected by a wage determination based on the prevailing wages in their own
centers. Further illustration of the impotence of the Act under the court's definition of
"locality" is that the seven plants in the industry paying the lowest wages are all in
geographically isolated centers. Id. at 78-84.
20. Evidence of the widespread sweep of the market in the iron and steel industry is
that for some purposes the entire United States provides a competitive area for manu-
facturers. Recommendations 116-118 (1938). The distance of customers from the Pitts-
burgh basing points has determined the extent of the market and not the distance of the
producers from the customers. Sec FTC REP. To THE Pn.xs., Nov. 30, 1934; FTC Release
No. F-6, March 7, 1939. Although the old basing point system has been abandoned, there
has been no appreciable alteration of marketing conditions in the steel industry. Sec In
re Iron and Steel Industry, 4 FED. REG. 267 (1939).
19401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A further objection to the court's position is that it imposes obstacles which
prohibit practical administration of the Act. The prevailing minimum wages
for supply contracts must be determined prior to the call for bids. 2 1 If the
court's definitions of "locality" be accepted, an accurate determination of
the predominant minimum wage will require that the administrators ascertain
the prevailing minimum wages in the hundreds of local centers of manu-
facture in each industry whence bids may be submitted. Since the fluctuation
of wages is more sharply reflected in a local center, a separate investigation
of all centers of manufacture might be required each time bids were to be
accepted for a government contract. 22 When a large regional area is selected,
however, the fluctuation of wages in one local center tends to counterbalance
an opposite fluctuation in another center in the same area. Readjustment of
a determination is thus necessary only when there is a long-range change
in the general wage level. It would seem that Congress did not intend
"locality" to be restricted to the court's definition, since Congress certainly
did not propose to impose an overwhelming burden upon the administrators
of the Act.
After deciding that the interpretation of "locality" by the Secretary was
arbitrary and capricious, the court relies on this abuse of authority to remove
the case from the category of suits against the United States without its
consent. An approach on these grounds vitiates the doctrine of sovereign
immunity on the very occasion it is most significant. Sovereign immunity
may be violated, of course, even though the suit is nominally against a public
official.2 3 The determinative factor, except when the action is founded on
a constitutional chall~nge,2 4 is whether the suit affects the United States.25
Applying this criterion, a well-established line of cases holds that, without
sovereign consent, there can be no suit against a public officer for damages 20
or for specific performance 2 7 when he refuses to perform an existing con-
21. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 35 a (Supp. 1938).
22. See In re Iron and Steel Industry, 4 Fmi. REG. 265, 266 (1939). Representations
pursuant to the Act have been made in 17,857 contracts; of this number, 1,875 contracts
were for iron and steel commodities. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL by L. Met-
calfe Walling, Administrator of Public Contracts Division, Nov. 15, 1939.
23. In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487 (1887) ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270,
287 (1884).
24. As in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
25. Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481 (1925) ; Haskins Bros. v. Morgenthau, 85 F.
(2d) 677 (App. D. C. 1936).
26. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934) ; United States v. Babcock, 250 U.
S. 328, 331 (1919); see SHEALEY, THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1938)
10. The United States has consented to be sued for contract claims in the Court of Claims.
24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. §250 (1) (1934).
27. Specific performance is never granted since the court would, in effect, be direct-
ing the conduct of the Government's business. Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918);
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Farley, 71 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 603 (1934). A petition for a writ of mandamus against the officer
cannot accomplish indirectly the effect of specific performance. United States e.x rel.
Shoshone Irr. Dist. v. Ickes, 70 F. (2d) 771 (App. D. C. 1934). This situation approxi-
mates a political question.
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tract or prohibits further performance by the contractor. A party's interest
in a contracting officer's observance of the sanctity of an existing contract
is certainly of greater importance than the right to have the officer lawfully
determine a condition for a future contract. Since the courts in the breach
of contract cases either assume that the officer's conduct is unlawful or do
not consider the question, no reason appears why the legality of the Secre-
tary's conduct should be relevant in the instant case. An apparent exception
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, grants relief when there
has been an illegal interference with "vested" rights.28 While it is possible
to argue that the plaintiffs' interest in freedom from alleged unlawful inter-
ference when they are negotiating for contracts is sufficiently "vested" to
bring them within the exception,2 0 this conclusion seems to conflict with the
authority that bars a suit against the United States for breach of contract.
If the complainants can overcome the apparent obstacle of sovereign im-
munity as they did in the instant case, the question then arises whether they
have sufficient legal interest to challenge a wage determination. An analysis
of the legal principles applicable to a potential bidder's interest to negotiate
for government contracts leads to the conclusion that there are no doctrinal
objections to his standing in court. Since no express provision of the Act
either grants or denies a prospective bidder a review of a determination of
prevailing minimum wages,30 the right to sue must come from the general
jurisdiction of the federal courts.3 ' It is well established that no person has
a legal right to challenge the conditions on which public work is made
28. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922) (unlawful seizure of goods) ; Noble v.
Union River Logging R. R., 147 U. S. 165 (1893) (acts constituting cloud on title);
Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, 540 (1914) (unlawful entry on land).
29. See note 36 infra.
30. § 5 of the Act authorizes the Secretary upon his own motion or on application
of any person affected by any ruling of any agency to hold hearings and make findings
which shall be conclusive if supported by the preponderance of the evidence. 49 STAT.
2038 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 39 (Supp. 1938). This section implies judicial review of proe-
cutions for violations of the Act; but Congress probably did not intent to include review
of the wage determinations authorized in § 4. 49 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 37
(Supp. 1938). Support for findings by a preponderance of the evidence is essential pro-
tection to a violator but would be an unusual burden for an administrative finding. Cf. 49
STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160 f (Supp. 1938) (supported by evidence) ; 52 STAT.
1065, 29 U. S. C. A. § 210 (Supp. 1938) (supported by substantial evidence). Employees,
the immediate beneficiaries of the Act, are given no right to challenge a determination.
See note 42 infra. If the subpoena power in § 5 were available for use in determining
wages, an unnecessary and possibly invalid inquisitorial power over all industry would b2
given to the Secretary. See Harriman v. I. C. C., 211 U. S. 407, 417 (1903). Subpo=as
have never been used in connection with wage determinations. Communication to Y'=
LAw Jomux.L. by Administrator of Public Contracts Division, Nov. 15, 1939. Since the
Act was passed as a direct result of the invalidation of the NRA in Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), it is unlikely that Congress intended its
new effort to be subjected to judicial scrutiny. See Comment (1939) 43 YAum L, J.
610, n. 3.
31. Cf. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939) ; Shields
v. Utah Idaho Central R. R., 305 U. S. 177 (1938); see (1939) 43 YXa, L J. 1257.
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available by sovereign authority.32 The Government's power to control its
own working conditions is not limited by the restrictions on its authority
to regulate similar conditions in private enterprise.33 It does not follow,
however, that since a person has no right to work for the Government that
he also has no right to challenge the Secretary's determination. It is neces-
sary to distinguish bet-ween the power of Congress to impose such conditions
as it sees fit for public contracts, and the alleged lack of authority of the
Secretary to impose additional restrictions not authorized by law, which
interfere with or obstruct a bidder in his efforts to do business with the
Government.34 The value of an interest to negotiate with the Government
as a prospective customer is no less than the value of an interest to negotiate
with a customer who is a private person. 35 Protection from unlawful inter-
ference in the latter situation is not denied on the ground that the party
seeking protection could not compel the customer to deal with him or could
not object to the conditions established by the customer if the party wishes
to enter contractual relations.3 6 Consequently, the absence of a right to
make a direct attack on the constitutionality of the Walsh-Healey Act is not
determinative in a consideration of the plaintiffs' right to challenge the
Secretary's determination.
This conclusion apparently controls the question relating to the speculative
character of the complainants' injuries. No contractor's privilege to bld
has been denied; even if he does bid, there is no assurance of acceptance.
The most serious effect an unlawful wage determination may have is to
destroy a possible profit of a potential bidder. The Secretary's argument,
however, that there is no irreparable injury because complainants cannot
32. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1903); Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246
(1906); Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915); Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243 (S. D.
Cal. 1939) ; cf. Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 31 (1905). But see Powell,
The Right to Work for the State (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 99. Mr. Powell contends that
Heim v. McCall, supra, denies aliens the equal protection of the laws.
33. Compare Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915) (regulation of aliens), with
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) (same) ; compare Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S.
246 (1906) (regulation of maximum hours), with Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935) (same).
34. Weinstein Building Corp. v. Scoville, 141 Misc. 902, 254 N. Y. Supp. 384 (Sup.
Ct. 1931) ; Ames v. Wallace, 1 S. C. D. C. (N. s.) 238 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1935), aff'd on
other grounds, 81 F. (2d) 414 (App. D. C. 1935) ; see Gillioz v. Webb, 99 F. (2d) 585,
586 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; United States ex rel. Johnston v. Morley, 17 F. Supp. 378, 388
(W. D. N. Y. 1936) ; 28 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 384, 389 (1910).
35. Government purchases under the Walsh-Healey Act constitute a significant mar-
ket. As of Oct. 28, 1939, approximately $1,397,577,000 worth of contracts has been award-
ed subject to the Act. Of these contracts, approximately $110,400,000 worth was for iron
and steel products. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL by L. Metcalfe Walling, Ad-
ministrator of Public Contracts Division, Nov. 15, 1939.
36. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 327 (1921) ; Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53
F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931); Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Mickle, 216 Fed. 246 (D. Ore.
1914) ; Pratt Food Co. v. Bird, 148 Mich. 631, 112 N. W. 701 (1907). The Secretary's
defense that the contractors could do business elsewhere is analogous to the old argu-
ments used to support the "yellow-dog" contracts (that employees could seek work else-
where). See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 11 (1915).
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prove that they would secure contracts, begs the basic question whether
they have a privilege to negotiate for contracts,37  If bidders have this
privilege to attempt to enter into business relations with the Government,
it is not necessary to show that such negotiations would be successful.P
The gravamen of the complaint is the alleged interference with the privilege
of bidding. Although the difficult part of the plaintiffs' proof is to show that
the alleged unlawful wage determination would raise costs to such an extent
that they are prevented from bidding, as a practical matter the effect of the
wage determination would be directly reflected in their profits because their
previous wage rates were below the level set by the determination. It would
be a denial of the Act's efficacy to claim that the existing wage rates of the
plaintiffs are not affected by a wage determination.29
In ostensible conflict with a recognition of any legal interest in the com-
plainants is the settled rule that since a lowest responsible bidder statute
is enacted for the benefit of the taxpayers and not for the contractor, a
rejected bidder cannot challenge the legality of the award of a Government
contract.40 Considerations of public policy lie behind the rule, for granting
an injunction against the award of a contract may paraly-ze vital functions
of Government business. But these issues are not relevant in the attack on
the wage determination under the Walsh-Healey Act, since the complainants
are not seeking to compel the award of the contracts to themselves but are
asserting their privilege to be free from alleged unlawful interference in
negotiating for contracts. 41 Unlike a lowest responsible bidder statute, the
AValsh-Healey Act was not passed for the taxpayers' benefit, since the Act
may actually increase the cost of supplies furnished the Government. Its
beneficiaries, primarily, are the employees of government contractors42 and,
37. When proof of irreparable injury is necessary to establish the invalidity of an
administrative ruling, it is because regulation that is originally lawful becomes unlawful
only when "turned into an act of tyranny." The question of standing to sue is not in-
volved. Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 170 (1934); California v.
Latimer, 305 U. S. 255, 260 (1938).
38. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ; cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 263 U. S.
510 (1925). Unlawful interference with an opportunity for a prize or gratuity will sup-
port an action for damages. 4 RF.sraTnsE.-r, TORTs (1939) § 912 f; Keegle v. Hickehrin-
gill, 11 East 574 (K. B. 1809); see Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq.
759, 53 At. 230 (1902) ; Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N. E. 243 (1907) ; Comment
(1935) 48 H-.uv. L. Ray. 984.
39. See Comment (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 610, 629 et seq.
40. O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D. Mass. 1934); United States Wood Pre-
serving Co. v. Sundmaker, 186 F. 678 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911) ; Talbot Paying Co. v. Detroit,
109 Mlich. 657, 67 N. W. 979 (1896) ; see American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United
States, 259 U. S. 75, 78 (1922) ; 3 McQurLLAN, luNicIPAL. Coronrlxo,.s (2d ed. 1923)
§ 1286. A bidder's suit in his capacity as a tax-payer would not be successful. Massa-
chusetts v. fellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) ; Wleless v. Mellon, 10 F. (2d) S93 (App. D. C.
1926).
41. See note 36 supra.
42. See note 3 supra. When a labor union claims that the wage determination for
state construction works is not the prevailing rate, the court may take judicial notice that
some members of the union would be employed on the works. Denver Bldg. & Coast.
Trades Council v. Vail, 103 Colo. 364, 86 P. (2d) 267 (1939). The broader and more
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partly, the contractors themselves.43 Nor are the policy considerations of
the cases on lowest responsible bidder statutes here applicable. Although an
injunction against the enforcement of a wage determination interferes with
the effort to affect wage standards, it is not an interference with the unin-
terrupted supply of government necessities, because new contracts can im-
mediately be let without the wage representations.
44
A further question bearing on the sufficiency of the complainants' legal
interest is whether they are seeking to be free from impairment of their
competitive position. If the unlawful act of an administrative officer gives
a competitive advantage to one class of persons that enables them to damage
their competitors, it is dammnun absque injuria.45 The basis of this rule is
that the unlawful act has not affected the objector except through the indirect
result of lawful competition. The objector is held to have no right to be
free from lawful competition 46 or to maintain an existing competitive ad-
vantage,47 for he has the alternatives of combatting the lawful competition
on his own terms or to discontinue business operations. 48 The complainants
in Lukens Steel v. Perkins, however, are not objecting to an act of the
Secretary which through its effect on third parties creates destructive corn-
uncertain field of supplies for the national government probably prohibits the use of this
technique for federal contracts.
43. The Government had received numerous objections from employers who were
underbid by persons maintaining sub-standard labor conditions. Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. i1554, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)
442, 529, 530.
44. The minimum wage provisions of the Walsh-Healey Act apply only to contracts
relating to industries that are the subject matter of a determination by the Secretary of
Labor. 49 STAT. 2039 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 45 (Supp. 1938). Subsequent to Lukens Steel
v. Perkins, contracts for iron and steel commodities have been awarded without minimum
wage representations by the contractor, conditional or otherwise. Communication to YALE
LAW JOURNAL by L. Metcalfe Walling, Nov. 18, 1939. A possible detriment to the Gov-
ernment is that contractors paying high wages will not bid; and there is a presumption
that well paid employees perform better work. Hearing before a Subcomnittee of the
Committee on the .Judiciary on H. R. 9745, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 139 (Statement
by Mr. Walling); see Wagner v. Milwaukee, 180 Wis. 640, 644, 192 N. W. 994, 996
(1923), writ of error dismissed, 266 U. S. 585 (1924) ; cf. (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 832, 835.
45. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 118
(1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938). But ef. Frost v. Corp.
Comm'n, 278 U. S. 515 (1929) (semble). See Comment (1938) 51 HARV. L. Rv. 897.
This rule would apparently control the case of an attack on a determination on the ground
that it was below a competitor's actual prevailing minimum wage.
46. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 626 (1934) ; Madera
Water Works v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454 (1913) ; see Railroad Company v. Ellerman, 105
U. S. 166, 173 (1881).. But cf. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 266 et seq.
(1924) ; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Gulf C. & Sante Fe Ry., 270 U. S. 266, 273 (1926).
47. Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U. S. 249 (1930) ; Edward Hines Trus-
tees v. United States, 263 U. S. 143 (1923) ; see United States v. Merchants & Manu-
facturers Traffic Ass'n, 242 U. S. 178, 189 (1916).




petition. Their objection rests on the claim that there is a direct and
immediate unlawful interference with their own operations.
If the complainants, as prospective bidders, are unable to challenge the
validity of a wage determination before they submit a bid, every possible
avenue of attack is closed. A tolerance section in the Act allows exemptions
before a contract is made, but this privilege arises only when the public
convenience so requires, and upon a motion by the Government.40 A bidder
must wait for acceptance of his proposal before exemptions are available
on his own motion.r0 If the bid were submitted without all required stipula-
tions it would be rejected.r1 After rejection, the contracting officer could
not be restrained from awarding the contract to a third party, nor could he
be mandamused to award the contract to the petitioner.52 If a proposal
included the required stipulations and is accepted, the bidder, as a recipient
of benefits, would be estopped from an attack on the validity of a determina-
tion.5
Although it appears that doctrinal precedent is not available to deny the
steel companies standing to sue, an obstacle might be presented by a forthright
emphasis on considerations of public policy. The Secretary of Labor is the
agent and subordinate of Congress for the determination of conditions in
Government contracts. Since the expressed will of Congress is the supreme
law in the domain of public contracts, the courts might well withdraw on
the ground that the supervision of government contracting agents is a duty
of Congress and not of the courts. The likelihood of such a power-renouncing
attitude, however, is diminished by analogous situations where the com-
plainant is granted a privilege subject to the absolute control and discretion
of Congress. Where there is an alleged unlawful interference by an executive
49. 49 STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U. S. C. § 40 (Supp. 1938).
50. Ibid. The plaintiffs requested that the hearing before the Board be reopened,
made objections to the Recommendation before the Secretary, and sought postponement of
the effective date of the determination. Record, pp. 20-24, Lukens Steel Co., cf al. v. Per-
kins, et al., No. 7368 (1939) 2 WAGE & HoUR REP. index p. 443 (App. D. C. 1939).
These actions probably exclude plaintiffs from requirement that though no specific
administrative remedy is available, relief should be sought first from the administrative
officers. Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U. S. 570 (1934) ; Goldsmith v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926); see Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S.
380, 394 (1912) ; cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50 cf seq. (1938).
51. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §35b (Supp. 1938).
52. See note 40 sipra.
53. St. Louis 'Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Const. Co., 260 U. S. 469 (1923);
Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 (10); cf. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of
Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); see Comments (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 610, 628,
(1934) 34 Cot. L. REV. 1495. An intentional violation of a minimum wage stipulation in
order to test the validity of a wage determination is impractical since the Act permits an
immediate cancellation of the contract and the party responsible therefor is liable for
liquidated damages. Also, the Comptroller General is authorized to "blachlist" any dio-
lator, for three years. 49 STAT. 2037 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §§ 36, 37 (Supp. 1938). The Act,
however, has been satisfactorily enforced without resort to the "blacklisting" provisions.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciar3, on H. R. 97.15, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 140 (Statement by Mr. Walling).
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officer with a party's use of this privilege, the courts in these cases recognize
a sufficient legal interest for a standing to sue.
54
If plaintiffs have standing in court, to what extent should the court review
the Secretary's determination? The range of judicial surveillance over
official acts executing unlimited powers of Congress is confined within narrow
limits. In cases involving these powers it is frequently held that the admin-
istrative officer's definition of terms and statutory constructions are final and
conclusive.55 The need for administrative finality is equally compelling in
the field of Government contracts, as the facts in the instant case well disclose.
A fairly uniform differential exists between the lower wage rates in the iron
and steel plants along the Atlantic seaboard, and those paid in the "Pittsburgh
District."", The majority of the Public Contracts Board refused to recom-
mend a differential on the grounds that the competitive advantage of the
lower wage area would endanger the higher wage level in the other district.
The minority stated that this differential should be recognized and relied
on the fact that the lower wage area had not received an undue proportion
of government contracts in the past. Despite arguments concerning the
propriety of the Secretary's determination a comparison of the conflicting
recommendations clearly illustrates that delimiting the boundaries of a
"locality" calls for elements of judgment that are extraneous to the statistical
aggregates. The meaning of "locality" is not so definite and certain," that
54. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) (harbor power) ; Amerl-
can School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902) (postal service) ;
Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918) (customs) ; Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98
F. (2d) 308 (App. D. C. 1938) (government land).
55. E.g., when discretion is required, the Land Department's definitions of terms and
statutory interpretations are conclusive. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 683 (1912); United
States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S, 316 (1903) ; Heath v. Wallace,
138 U. S. 573 (1891); see DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPIREMACy
OF LAW (1927) 277 et seq. The Comptroller General's discretionary decisions are final
notwithstanding probable errors of fact or law. Adams v. Nagle, 303 U. S. 532 (1938).
A bidder's interest in government contracts is no greater than his interest in unrestricted
access to the postal facilities. Yet, the courts presume that questions of law are correctly
decided by the Post-Office Department and will sustain the exercise of discretion unless the
decision is a rational impossibility. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497
(1904); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904) ; accord, Louisiana v. McAdoo,
234 U. S. 627 (1914) (tariff) ; Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263 (U. S. 1853) (customs);
but cf. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902).
56. In the "Pittsburgh district" and the Mid-Western area the companies that em-
ploy 81% of the total number of workers paid common labor a base rate of 62,c. an
hour. In the states along the Atlantic seaboard the plants that employed 71% of all work-
ers paid 56%-c. an hour as a base rate. Recommendations, 142-143 (1938). This 6c. differ-
ential, plus a fair uniformity of wage levels in the respective regions appear to fulfill
established requisites for geographic differentials. See note 7 m.pra. The plaintiffs' ob-
jections to the determination rest on the failure of the Secretary to recognize this differ-
ential. These districts were consolidated in the determination because the 621/c. rate
numerically predominated the combined areas. In re Iron and Steel Industry, 4 FMo. Ria.
265, 268 (1939).
57. Locality may mean a district of "undefined extent." 6 NEW ENGLISu DIC'rIONARY
ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPI.ES (1908) 380 (4b). The United States Supreme Court has held
NOTES
the Secretary's interpretation may be called a rational impossibility or an
act in bad faith. 8 The Secretary's functional definition, taking cognizance
of the purposes and administrative requirements of the Act, should therefore,
in the absence of a showing of bad faith, be conclusive.
RIGHTS OF PERFORMERS AND RECORDERS AGAINST
UNLICENSED RECORD BROADCASTS*
IN 1937 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the celebrated Waring
case,1 recognized a performer's property right in his musical renditions by
enjoining a radio station from making unlicensed broadcasts2 of his records.
A logical sequence to the result there reached is a recent federal decision,
R. C. A. Manufacturing Compang, v. WIhitc;nan.3 which extends to record
manufacturers the right to enjoin unauthorized broadcasts of their products.
Since the court found that the recording process, unlike the performer's
style of playing, was not such an artistic creation as might be deemed an
intellectual property right,4 RCA's injunction against the offending station
that the meaning of locality in a state construction contract statute .as too uncertain to
be a basis for criminal penalties. The court stated that the word's connotation depended
upon the circumstances of its use; and further stated that a locality may include areas.
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 395 (1926). These statements may
authorize an even more liberal construction of locality in the federal statute which, of
course, is free from the territorial limits of a state statute. But cf. Te':as & P. Ry. v.
United States, 289 U. S. 627, 638 (1933).
58. Since the first determination under the Act (over two years prior to Lfhelns Steel
v. Perkins), was determined without regard to local differentials and the Secretary has
always considered a 'locality" as a great regional area, the silence of Congress may
imply acquiescence. See Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 294, 313
(1933); United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183, 193 (1930); Hearings before a Sv!-
committee of the Cominmittec on the Judiciary on H. R. 97,15, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)
139 (question by Representative Healey).
*RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
1. W'Varing v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 AUt. 631 (1937).
2. The court found in Waring's rendition an artistic creation giving rise to an
intellectual property right, or "common law copyright," and that therefore Varing
could enjoin unlicensed broadcasts of his records by Station VDAS. Although tra-
ditionally the general publication of an artist's work effected an abandonment of his
rights, Waring's intent to prohibit broadcasting, as manifested by restrictive labels
placed on each record sold, preserved them here.
An alternative ground for the injunction w.'as that the broadcasts constituted unfair
competition with Waring, principally because they detracted from his prestige with radio
sponsors, and also because they reduced his record sales by overfrequent playings and by
indiscriminate selection which included defective and outmoded records.
3. 28 F. Supp. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
4. RCA (formerly Victor) had vigorously asserted that its recording process was
a work of talent, since, as admitted by Toscanini and other conductors, an adequate
recording without the surveillance of acoustical e.\perts wNas impossible. Communication
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
was based upon the manufacturer's right to be protected against unfair com-
petition and upon the performer's rights which were assigned to RCA.,
Apart from the legal issues presented by the Waring and Whiteman
decisions,6 their practical results should be examined, for they have high-
lighted manifold difficulties in the enforcement of the rights of performers
and recorders. Assuming the conclusion of both courts, that such protection
is desirable, the actual value of the safeguards afforded by these decisions
becomes questionable upon a factual analysis of their effect in the musical
recording field. 7 First, the specific remedy authorized by the courts, the
injunction, affords but negligible protection to either group. Laborious proof
of injury is necessary in each case; and even if an injunction be obtained,
only the particular station involved is affected by it and then only to the
extent that it must cease broadcasting a few designated records. Owing to
the short life of most popular records, the harm is usually done before the
injunction can issue. Moreover, the legal remedy of damages is not feasible
because of insurmountable difficulties of proof as to the pecuniary loss suffered.
If it is extremely difficult to prove that a particular broadcast results in
waning commercial reputation or declining record sales, it is obvious that
it is even more difficult to measure the financial loss involved. The futility
of court action is shown by the fact that only five suits have been brought
against unlicensed users of records,8 and their cumulative effect has not been
to YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for RCA, Sept. 25, 1939. Littauer, Present Legal
Status of Artists, Recorders, and Broadcasters in America (1938) 3 GEsTiGEs EIGFNTUM
217, 230.
5. RCA sought to enjoin unlicensed broadcasts by WNEW and to enjoin Whiteman
from representing to radio that he, by the terms of his recording contracts with RCA,
had the sole right to license broadcasts. Both injunctions were granted. The court
found, on the Waring doctrine, that Whiteman had both a property right in his renditions
and a right against unfair competition, but that in two of the three contracts involved,
these rights were assigned to RCA. However, even in this case it was held that RCA
had independent rights based on the doctrine of unfair competition. Thus it could enjoin
not only radio broadcasts but also representations by Whiteman that he alone could
license broadcasts. Both sides have appealed from this decision not only on its rules
of law but on its contract interpretation.
6. The legal issues of the Waring case have been extensively discussed and the
result approved. Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist (1938)
COPYRIGHT LAW Sympnosium 9; Bass, Interpretative Rights of Pero rmitg Artists (1937)
42 Dicx. L. REV. 57; Littauer, Present Legal Status of Artists, Recorders, and Broad-
casters in Anerica (1938) 3 GEISTIGES EIGENTum 217; Notes (1938) 18 B. U. L. Rsv.
441, (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 181, (1937) 51 HARV. L. Rv. 171, (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 217, (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 333, (1938) 23 WAsH. U. L. Q. 283. Cf. (1938) 22
MINN. L. REv. 559.
7. The scope of this Note will be limited to radio's unlicensed broadcasts and will
not deal with the use of records for other commercial purposes.
8. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939) (suit to enjoin the
playing of electrical transcriptions which had never been sold to the public); RCA v.
Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Noble v. 160 Commonwealth Ave.,
19 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mass. 1937) (performer denied injunction against night club
broadcasts because his rights, if any, had been assigned to recorder) ; Waring v. WDAS,
327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937); Crumit v. Marcus Loew, 162 Misc. 225, 293 N. Y.
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to diminish unlicensed broadcasts in general.0 Further, if the judicial remedy
were adequate,-" the additional task remains of establishing the WVaring-
Whitenwan doctrine in some forty-six jurisdictions, where it has not as yet
been accepted."
Even in the rare circumstance where an injunction is feasible, hostile legis-
lation now threatens to destroy this small protection for performers and
recorders. Shortly after the federal district court in North Carolina enjoined
a local station from broadcasting electrical transcriptions without permission, -
"all common law rights in records" were abolished by the state legislature.' 3
Similar bills were passed in South Carolina' 4 and proposed in Florida.15 This
legislation appears to be inspired solely by the self-interest of one class, the
commercial users of records. 16 The statutes, scarcely indicative of a general
public-policy, may well be held unconstitutional under the due process and
abrogation of contract clauses.1 - Yet wholly aside from the question of their
validity, the expense of litigation challenging them is so great' s as to hamper
seriously any attack, particularly so long as the common law protection for
interests in records is as ineffectual as at present.
A further obstacle to a realization of the benefits which should logically
accrue to performers and recorders from the [Faring and llhitenan decisions
may be offered by the opposition of groups in related fields.1 After the
Supp. 63 (Sup. Ct 1936) (performer denied recovery because his rights, if any, Were
assigned to recorder).
9. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for RCA, Oct. 10, 1939.
10. A logical implication of the injunction granted in the WVaring and WI'hiloenan
cases might afford too complete a remedy; for the broadcasting of all records bearing
a restrictive notice might be enjoined in perpeluo, thus resulting in an over-severe judicial
monopoly. See note 61 infra.
11. Only the Waring (Pa.) and the W'iteman (N.Y.) cases explicitly rule on
rights in records. For the other decisions not expressly raising these issues, see note 3
supra.
12. INTaring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E. D. N. C. 1939).
13. N. C. CODE ANN.. (Mitchie, 1939) § 5126(s).
14. S. C. Acts 1939, No. 28.
15. Florida, Sen. Bill No. 637 (1939).
16. Recorders plausibly assert that this legislation was the work of "organized
lobbies." Memorandum for Decca Records, Inc., before The Committee for The Study
of Copyright, p. 12. The authorship of bills directed against composers fees has been
convincingly traced by ASCAP to radio and other users of records. Communication to
YALE LAW JomuRAL from counsel for ASCAP, Sept. 29, 1939. See Comment (1939)
33 Ii. L. Rav. 548, 549, 553.
17. Prohibitory Florida statutes directed against ASCAP have been held invalid.
See note 40 infra.
18. See note 42 infra.
19. The American Federation of Musicians, whose primary objective is to increase
employment for the rank and file musicians whom it represents, has recently adopted
a rule providing that none of its members may assign to any recorder their "broadcasting
rights" without the express consent of the Federation. Communication to YA=tn LAw
.TOuRNAL from counsel for National Association of Broadcasters, OcL 18, 1939. A
powerful union, A.F.M. probably can withhold this consent from recorders so that,
under the Wihiteman doctrine, they Will not have the sole right to license even after they
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Whiternan decision, RCA, one of the largest recorders, proposed a plan for
the licensing of broadcasters who use its records.2 0 Radio has ignored this
scheme, 21 and its success as a revenue device for recorders is threatened by
the demands of music publishers for a large share of the putative income."
Publishers appear sufficiently powerful to enforce this "request," for they
possess, by assignment from composers, the mechanical recording privileges
which are granted by statute to copyright owners of musical compositions. 23
If record popularity, as seems likely, credits more the fashionable orchestra
than the popular tune,24 the band's share in broadcasting revenue should be
larger than the publisher's. Instead, the lion's share seems destined for the
publishers,25 simply because, being the sole copyright owner,20 they are the
strongest bargainer in this triangular dispute with recorders and performers.
Determination of the profit-distribution between orchestra, recorders and
publishers by ill-balanced bargaining power would mean that judicial recog-
nition of rights in records, if it should accomplish anything at all, would
enrich the publishers at the expense of those primarily intended to be its
beneficiaries.
Thus practical difficulties make protection for performers and recorders
through judicial decision alone of little avail. Assuming effective protection
to be desirable, it is apparently obtainable only through legislation. Uniform
have acquired the performer's rights. That musicians less accomplished than conductors
or soloists also have an intellectual property right in renditions appears established by
the language of the Waring decision. See Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 442, 194 Atl.
631, 635 (1937).
20. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for RCA, Sept. 26, 1939.
Decca Records, Inc., has followed suit, but Columbia is reputed to have offered thelir
privileges free to at least one station in an effort to underbid its rivals for radio adver-
tising. Another recorder intends to prohibit broadcasting altogether. Communication to
YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for National Association of Broadcasters, Dec. 5, 1939.
21. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for RCA, Oct. 10, 1939.
In the metropolitan vicinity something in the nature of a truce appears to exist by which
some stations have ceased broadcasting restricted records until the recorders' policy
becomes more clear.
In 1938 RCA had tried to license broadcasts, but without success.
22. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for National Association
of Broadcasters, Oct. 18, 1939.
23. 35 STAT. 1075, 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
24. The popularity of a Goodman, Dorsey or Lombardo does more to sell records
than preferences for the composition played. In classical music, of course, the composer
is far more significant, yet Toscanini and Koussevitsky are nonetheless favorites.
25. At first, publishers demanded 50% of the gross license revenues. This demand
was modified after recorders offered to split the fees three ways among artists, recorders,
and publishers: Communications to YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for RCA. Any
payment at all to publishers owning recording rights is to the extent that it flows back
to the composers a double payment for them, inasmuch as they are already paid through
ASCAP for broadcasts of their music, whether "live" or "canned."
26. Although the arranger may copyright his work, he must obtain the consent of
the owner of the composer's copyright. 35 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 6 (1934).
Ordinarily, gifted arrangers do not bother to copyright their work, as it is more profitable
to write for one big-name band without publishing for the general market.
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state laws granting and providing for the enforcement of property rights in
records are, of course, possible; but the multiple difficulties of enactment,
and the probable local variations that would develop make such a scheme
impractical.2 7 Radio's disregard of geographical and jurisdictional boundaries
points rather to the necessity of federal legislation; and the federal copy-
right power offers a desirable solution. A copyright in records, with pro-
visions for statutory damages 28 similar to those found so effective in the
composer's copyright,29 appears the most effective method of checking un-
licensed broadcasts. And only through exercise of the exclusive federal
copyright power could partisan state laws abolishing property rights in records
be superseded. 30
But the drafting and enactment of a copyright in records will be difficult.
Even if such a bill could survive the opposition of radio and composers to
any copyright at all, 31 a complex problem would arise in determining which
of the chief claimants should own the copyright. Recorders and "performers,"
who are for this purpose synonymous with orchestra leaders, have each laid
claim to the copyright, and bills on behalf of the latter have already been
introduced in Congress.3 2 Their claims have been considered necessarily
exclusive -not because the validity of either cause is questioned, but because
enforcement would be overcomplicated if each party owned a separate copy-
right.3 3 Both a copyright for performers and one for recorders has been
considered recently by the Shotvell Committee for the Study of Copyright,
which is drafting a privately proposed revision of the federal copyright
27. See Bass, op. cit. supra note 6, at 68.
28. The Daly Bill, H. R. 5275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), proposing a copyright
in records, set the minimum at $500. The bill was never reported back from committee.
29. 35 STAT. 10S1 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 25 (b) (1934). The provision for minimum
damages ($250) has been so effective as a deterrent that only $8,800 has been collected
by ASCAP for infringements in twenty-seven years. Hearings before the Committee
on Patents for Revision of the Copyright Laut, H. R., 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 201,
202. See Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 433, 442.
30. Both the North and South Carolina Acts provided that they should not conflict
with the federal copyright power. N. C CODE ANN. (Mitchie, 1939) § 5126 (s) ; S. C.
Acts 1939, No. 28, § 2.
31. Broadcasters are naturally opposed to any addition to the $3,500,000 annual fees
paid to ASCAP. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1939, p. 19, col. 1. ASCAP is militantly hostile
to any increase in the strength of a rival for this radio revenue. It has also been asserted
that a copyright in records would unfairly deprive composers of their exclusive rights
Memorandum of Musical Publishers Protective Association, submitted to the Committee
for the Study of Copyright, p. 5. This viewpoint is myopic in its failure to concede
that, particularly in America, it is the performers who make music a commercial success.
Even in Europe an identical argument by French and Italian composers' associations
has been questioned. Ostertag, Nonvelles Propositions pour la Conferenee de Bruxelles
(1939) 52 DRorr D'AuTEuR 62, 65.
32. H. R. 10632, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H. R. 5275, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937); H. R. 6160, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). These bills were inspired by the
National Association of Performing Artists (NAPA) of which Fred Waring and Paul
Whiteman are directors. None have met with any success.
33. Littauer, op. cit. supra note 6, passim; Pforzheimer, op. cit. supra note 6, passim.
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
law.34 Neither claim has as yet met with any success, owing to the dissension
among the contending groups, 35 but continued lack of protection for per-
formers and recorders may soon force a reconciliation of differences and a
choice between the two claims.
In determining the proper owner of the copyright, the performer's claim,
at first glance, appears superior to the recorder's. Insofar as copyrights are
designed to reward talent, performers are the deserving artists rather than
recorders. But the source of artistic creation bears little relation to attain-
ment of the maximum protection ultimately desirable for both claimants.
Effective enforcement in the interests of both performers and recorders should
instead be the determinative factor in choosing the copyright owner.
If this be the criterion taken for selection, then definite administrative
drawbacks to a performer's copyright immediately appear. An obvious
practical defect in a copyright for artists is the formidable difficulty in de-
termining who among the several performers should receive the copyright.8
Certainly, conductor, soloist and orchestra members all contribute to the
performance. Surprisingly enough, bills favoring a copyright for performers
overlooked this dilemma until recently ;37 yet a solution is possible. A com-
pulsory assignment of each contributing artist's rights to one representative
would facilitate selection.3 8 This, however, would not eliminate an even more
serious weakness in the performer's copyright; for, if users of records should
be required to obtain licenses from each performer owning a copyright, a
chaotic jumble unsatisfactory both to performers and radio would result.
In contrast, a recorder-copyright can raise no initial dispute as to copyright
ownership, and further, since there are only four American recorders,
licensees could negotiate much more conveniently. Moreover, it is doubtful
whether numerous orchestras, each holding a copyright in its renditions,
could detect and prosecute infringements with a fraction of the efficiency
possible to a few recorders. Of course, an association of performers might
34. The Committee for the Study of Copyright is part of the American National
Committee for International Intellectual Cooperation of which Prof. James Shotwell is
chairman. The Shotwell Bill is scheduled to come up before Congress in March, 1940.
84 Cong. Rec., Aug. 1, 1939, at 14799.
35. NAPA, the American Federation of Musicians and recorders each fought for
ownership of a copyright in records while ASCAP and radio objected to it altogether.
Recording publishers were willing to support a recorder's copyright only in exchange
for the termination of the present statutory license provision which compels them to
license, after the initial licensing release, any recorder who wanted their music. Neither
the Committee itself nor the various groups were able to agree on the exact reason why
a copyright in records was omitted from the Shotwell draft. Communications to YALF
LAW JOURNAL from counsel for RCA, counsel for National Association of Broadcasters,
and from the Executive Secretary of the Shotwell Committee. Such bitter conflicts of
economic interests have habitually blocked attempts to amend the copyright laws. Legis.
(1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 906; See (1937) 8 AIR L. REv. 213, 216, 220.
36. Littauer, op. cit. mpra note 6, at 232; Pforzheimer, op. cit. supra note 6 at 31.
37. See note 38 infra.
38. The McGranery Bill, H. R. 6160, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) gives the copy-
right to the orchestra conductor. The 1936 Austrian Act carries a similar provision.
LISSBAUER, AUSTRIAN AUTHORSHIP RIGHT LAWS (Racz's transl. 1937) 32. The Austrian
Act is to become the law of Germany. Ostertag, op. cit. supra note 31, at 62.
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conceivably solicit the rights of individual copyright holders and eventually
become sole agent. But whatever administrative superiority a possible pooling
of copyrights might achieve at the start is not certain to be maintained in
the future. A similar copyright pool for composers, the American Society
of Authors, Composers, and Publishers, has been seriously checked in certain
states under recent statutes,39 and it is probable that similar acts would be
passed which would greatly impair the effectiveness of any performer's pool.
Although one of the more stringent anti-ASCAP acts has been held invalid
by a lower court,40 milder ones may well be sustained if the interference with
the exclusive federal copyright power is considered too indirect to be un-
constitutional.41 At any rate the considerable expense of fighting this legis-
lation has somewhat hampered ASCAP's effectiveness 2 The recorder's
copyright is not so vulnerable, for any attack upon the oner's own exercise
of the copyright privileges would be unmistakably a direct interference with
the federal power which would be far less likely to be sustained.4 3 And not
only is proprietorship by recorders demonstrably more efficacious than by
performers, but also the consequent notion or a copyright in the marketing
entrepreneur is not without precedent. In the film industry, which is similar
to the recording industry in many aspects, a copyright in producer rather
than in actor has developed as the practical solution 14 Experience with a
39. Alaska Laws 1939, c. 13; F. Comp. Gr-r. LAws ANN. (Skillman, Supp. 1938)
§ 7954, Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19653; Kansas Laws 1939, c. 306; Mont Laws 1937, c. 90,
and Laws 1939, c. 123; NEBLF ComT. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §59-1201; N. D. Laws 1939,
c. 115; TEoNr. CoDE ANN. (Williams, Supp. 1939) § 6761; WAsrr. REV. STAT. (Reming-
ton, Supp. 1939) § 3802.
40. Gibbs v. Buck, U. S. Dist. Ct., Fla., .Oct. 21, 1939. Suits are pending in the
other states. Communication to YALE LAw Jouarxu. from counsel for ASCAP, Sept. 29,
1939. The grounds of the Florida decision probably were lack of due process, abro-
gation of contract, and invasion of the exclusive federal copyright power. See Gibbs v.
Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 69 (1939).
41. Perhaps the mildest act is the present Montana law which does not outlaw
ASCAP, nor prohibit blanket licensing as other acts have done, but does require that
composers file copious data with the Secretary of State and prohibits composers from
charging for collateral programs on which their music is not actually played. Mont. Laws
1939, c. 123. Though a great hindrance to ASCAP, this type of law may be sustained
if courts think in terms of monopoly, or police power, instead of copyright. See Para-
mount Pictures v. Langner, 23 F. Supp. 890, 895 (1938) (statute prohibiting copyright
owner from controlling the exhibitors of its work held no invasion of copyright power) ;
cf. Comment (1939) 33 ILr_ L. REv. 548, 555. Indeed Justice Black has indicated that
even a complete prohibition of copyright pools would be constitutional, because they are
a monopoly. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 81-84 (1939).
42. Communication to YALE LAw JouRNAL from counsel for ASCAP, Sept. 29, 1939.
43. Of course, a direct but mild interference with the copyright owner might be
sustained. See Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347 (1906) (patents) and cases there cited.
But a pool of copyright owners is susceptible to treatment as an illegal combination. See
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 81-84 (1939) ; Interstate
Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 203, 227 (1939) (successful prosecution under the
Anti-Trust Act).
44. 37 STAT. 488 (1912), 17 U. S. C. §5(m)(n) (1934).
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recorder's copyright in England 45 and several other countries 40 has proved
its feasibility.
In America, however, the recorder's lack of artistic contribution 47 might
offer a plausible reason for awarding the copyright to performers, for it
might render unconstitutional a copyright which was based solely upon the
recording process. Of course, any copyright in records will be unconstitu-
tional, whoever the owner, if a record cannot be considered as a "writing"
within the constitutional provision,48 but previous judicial inclusion within
this privileged classification of the photograph 4 9 and moving picture filmr °
should preclude any constitutional objections on this score. And while "talent"
was once a significant prerequisite for copyright recognition, 1 the require-
ment has been construed so broadly as to be immaterial today, z Thus the
recorder's contribution would seem to be copyrightable as well as the artist's.
In any case, the customary assignment of the performer's "talent" to the
recorder would provide an unassailable basis for a recorder's copyright, 8
so constitutional issues should be of little weight in determining either the
availability of a copyright in records or the choice of its owner.
A recorder's copyright, however, has distinct limitations, even if it does
offer a valid and effective method of protecting interests in records. It cannot
45. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46, § 19(1). This statute has been reenacted
throughout British Empire. Koepfle, Copyright Protection throughout the World;
Part Two: The British Empire, Ind. Prop. Bull., U. S. Dep't of Commerce, June 20,
1936.
46. Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, and Finland, and the erstwhile countries of Austria,
Czechoslovakia and Poland have been said to have some form of recorder's copyright.
Cf. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 28, at 1364; Littauer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 236; and
memorandum of Decca Records, Inc., submitted to the Committee for the Study of
Copyright, p. 6. The English text of every statute is set out without annotation by
Koepfle in Copyright Protection throughout the World, Ind. Prop. Bull., U. S. Dep't
of Commerce, May 20, June 20, Aug. 10, Sept. 21, Oct. 27, 1936, and Jan. 10 and 15,
1937. Decisions, however, have denied that a recorders' copyright was intended under
some of these statutes: See Baum, Die Urteile in den Proacsscn u-wischcn Rundfunk und
Schallplattenindustrie und ihre Kritik, (1938) 3 GEISTIGES EIGENTU,% 239; (1939) 4
COPYPIGHT 372.
47. This conclusion of the Whiteman decision might be questioned. See note 4 supra.
48. U. S. CoNsT. ART. III, § 8. The basis of this contention is White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908) which held that a piano roll was not
a "copy" of sheet music, but the decision concerned the intent of Congress to include
piano rolls within the meaning of "copy" in the 1891 Act, and no issue of constitutionality
was raised.
49. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53 (1884).
50. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theatre, 3 F. Supp. 66
(D. Mass. 1933).
51. See Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REy. 932.
52. Ibid. Circus posters, telephone directories, and citators have been held copy-
rightable. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239 (1903); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F. (2d) 484, (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; Shepard v. Taylor, 193
F. 991 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
53. To protect recorders in all cases, this assignment could be made compulsory.
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by itself guarantee an equitable distribution of radio proceeds to performers,
which the artists are probably unable to contract for themselves, nor does
it offer any protection at all against appropriation of the "live," or unrecorded,
renditions.m Further, an unqualified copyright makes no provision for a
limitation in the amount of license fees, which might seem consonant with
public interest in the wide dissemination of music afforded by broadcasts.
To avoid these weaknesses in a recorder's copyright, supplemental provisions
should be enacted. Extreme protection for performers might possibly be
accomplished by giving them an additional, separate copyright, as is pro-
vided in Germany. 0 But the existence of tvo copyright proprietors would
greatly complicate the licensing of records,57 a factor recognized by a proposed
revision of the German law. 5 It would be simpler to prevent appropriation
of live renditions by following England's example of making any recording
without the performer's permission a criminal offense.r' And to guarantee
to performers an equitable share in license revenues, Congress should require
that a certain minimum proportion of the fees be paid to them.00
In addition to these provisions limiting recorders' privileges in favor of
performers, some general restriction upon the copyright itself is desirable
in the interests of the public. Although the enactment of a copyright might
not diminish severely the broadcasts of records, since broadcasts of moderate
frequency advertise rather than overpopularize the recorder's product, never-
theless provision for maximum license fees and a short term"' for the copy-
right may be desirable in order to insure to the public the continued benefit
of frequent recorded broadcasts. Ancillary to maximum fees, a compulsory
license provision similar to that applied to the composer's copyright' 2 would
be a highly commendable method of preventing an undue restriction of
54. Illustrative of the weak position of performers is the fact that in less than a
dozen cases have they been able to reserve their broadcasting rights. Memorandum of
The National Association of Broadcasters, released to its members after the WIzhteian
decision, p. 3.
55. Toscanini's first broadcasts over NBC were made into records directly from
the receiving set.
56. Germany: Law of May 22, 1910, 1910 RErcHsGEs-7MLA r 793, art. 1, par. 2.
57. Littauer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 235.
58. Ostertag, op. cit. sutpra note 31, at 64.
59. 15 & 16 Geo. V. c. 46, § 1(a) (1925).
60. Such a pro rata provision would be less cumbersome than giving the performer
a right to an equitable share in the proceeds, to be determined by the court, as has been
done in Latin-American countries. The Argentine: Law of Sept. 23, 1933, LAws or
ARGENTINA (De Marval. transl. 1933) 1233, art. 56; Uruguay: Law of Dec. 17, 1937,
(1938) 51 Daorr D'AuTma 55, art. 36. Cf. NuEvo CoDrGo CmL, art. 1, 191 (Me.ico,
1936).
61. The term should be long enough to protect the performer during his commercial
"lifetime" from injury through the playing of his earlier and perhaps inferior recordings.
Through a copyright for a specific term, the undesirable monopoly of an in perpctio
injunction would be avoided, for under traditional copyright law, publication is an
abandonment of common-law rights, and the artist's protection is based solely on the
statute. See Universal Film v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Wagner
v. Conred, 125 Fed. 798 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903).
62. 35 STAT. 1075, 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
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broadcasts. 3 Under such a clause any station might obtain a license at the
statutory fee after the recorder had initially licensed the record or repertoire
of records to a rival station.
If the desirability of protection for performers and recorders be accepted,
it would seem apparent that a recorder's copyright, buttressed by the sug-
gested ancillary legislation, would give most effective expression to the safe-
guards which the Waring and Whiteman cases sought, but failed, to attain.
JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 77 OVER PLENARY
SUITS AGAINST NON-RESIDENTS*
PRIOR to the enactment in 1933 of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,'
the usual method of reorganizing insolvent railroads was through equity
receivership proceedings in the federal courts.2 As part of these proceedings,
the court, if it had jurisdiction over the parties, entertained plenary suits
brought by the receiver for such purposes as recovering claims of the rail-
road. 3 Jurisdiction over the subject matter was not predicated on diversity
of citizenship or fulfillment of jurisdictional amount, but was regarded as
ancillary to the court's jurisdiction in the main proceeding.4 Equity receiver-
ship courts occupied a unique position in this respect, since bankruptcy courts
in general had no such jurisdiction over plenary actions.6 With the exception
of consent suits and those brought under Sections 60, 67 and 70, Section
23 of the Bankruptcy Act 6 limited the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
in actions brought by the trustee, to courts where the bankrupt might have
brought them if bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted.7
63. Such a provision would be particularly desirable since two of the recorders are
subsidiaries of the two largest radio chains and consequently might restrict broadcasting
to their own systems.
* Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., et aI., 104 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939),
cert. denied, 7 U. S. L. Wz x 356 (U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 10, 1939).
1. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 49 STAT. 1969 (1936), 11 U. S. C.
§205 (Supp. 1938).
2. Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act (1934) 48
HARV. L. REv. 39.
3. White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36 (1895); Barfield v. Zenith Tire & Rubber Co.,
9 F. (2d) 204 (N. D. Ohio 1924), aff'd, sub. norn. Kirby v. Wilson, 27 F. (2d) 327 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1928).
4. See Gerdes, Jurisdiction of the Court in Proceedings Under Section 77B (1935)
4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 237, 272, and cases there cited.
5. Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524 (1900) ; Jaquith v. Rowley, 188 U. S.
620 (1903) ; Kelley v. Gill, 245 U. S. 116 (1917).
6. 44 STAT. 664 (1926), 11-U. S. C. §46 (1934).
7. "A United States District Court has jurisdiction of (a) plenary actions brought
pursuant to Sections 60, 67 and 70, regardless of the defendant's consent, (b) of any
plenary suit by the receiver or trustee to which the defendant consents, and (c) such
other plenary actions not falling within (a) and (b) supra as could have been main-
tained in the federal courts by the debtor had not proceedings under this act ensued."
MooRE's BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1939) 1f 23.01.
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The method of reorganization provided by Section 77 is in many respects
a codification of the former equity receivership method,8 but the powers and
jurisdiction of the federal courts acting in reorganization proceedings under
the section are defined in terms of the jurisdiction and powers of both equity
receivership and bankruptcy courts. Thus subdivision (1) of Section 77
confers upon the reorganization court the powers and jurisdiction of an
ordinary bankruptcy court. Another provision declares that the reorganiza-
tion court shall "have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located, and shall have and may exercise in addition to the powers
conferred by this section all the powers, not inconsistent with this section,
which a federal court would have had if it had appointed a receiver in equity
of the property of the debtor for any purpose." These provisions give rise
to the question whether Congress, in expressly conferring upon the reor-
ganization court powers equal to those of an equity receivership court, im-
pliedly granted the jurisdiction of such a court. The next sentence of sub-
division (a) relates to the court's jurisdiction over persons: "Process of the
court shall extend to and be valid when served in any judicial district." This
provision should apparently enable the railroad reorganization court to
exercise a much wider in personam jurisdiction than its predecessors, since
neither the federal equity receivership court nor the bankruptcy court could
issue valid process outside its own district.' 0
A recent case" presents one of the first judicial interpretations of these
jurisdictional provisions of Section 77.12 The trustee of the Missouri Pacific
8. See FImEraR, Tre LAW OF BANxRupTcY REORGANIZATION (1939) 18, 19.
9. 49 StAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 a (Supp. 1938).
10. Barfield v. Zenith Tire & Rubber Co., 9 F. (2d) 204 (N. D. Ohio 1924) ; Bovay
v. Byllesby & Co., 88 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). Rule 4 (f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that the process of a district court may be served anywhere
within the state in which the court is situated. Section 56 of the Judicial Code provides
an exception where the process of a federal court may run throughout the circuit. 36
StAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 117 (1934). For in rem actions, see 36 STAT. 1102
(1911), 28 U. S. C. § 118 (1934).
11. Thompson v. Terminal Shares. Inc., ct aL, 104 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939 1,
cert. denied, 7 U. S. L. WVm 356 (U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. 10, 1939).
12. Section 77 as amended by the Act of Aug. 27, 1935, 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11
U. S. C. §205 (Supp. 1938), conferred upon the railroad reorganization court enxactly
the same subject matter jurisdiction over entities dealt with in Section 77 as that pos-
sessed by a court acting under § 77B. 48 ST.AT. 912, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (1934). Therefore
cases arising under § 77B are applicable on the question of the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the court acting under § 77. However, none of the cases cited in the principal
case are binding authority. In re Prima Co., 98 F. (2d) 952. 958 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938),
involved a summary suit, but it contains a dictum that § 23 of the Bankruptcy Act applies
to a reorganization court so that it cannot entertain a plenary suit. Matter of United
Sportwear Co., 28 Am. B. R. (r. s.) 456, 457 (D. Mass. 1935) is a similar case. A
contrary result was reached in Thomas v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp. 839, 841 (NM D. X. Y.
1935), where a court acting under § 77B entertained a plenary suit apparently on the
erroneous ground that an unliquidated claim for money alleged to have been wrong-
fully taken from the debtor is "property" of the debtor over which the reorganization
court has exclusive jurisdiction. The court expressed the belief that § 23 did not apply
to a court acting under § 77B. In re Patten Paper Co., 86 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940]
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Railroad filed an ancillary bill in a federal district court for the eastern district
of Missouri as part of the reorganization proceedings then pending in that
court. Plaintiff prayed for an accounting by the defendants and the recovery
of $3,200,000 advanced to the defendant Terminal Shares, Inc., by Missouri
Pacific as part payment under four allegedly invalid contracts contemplating
the purchase of certain stocks and notes of various Missouri corporations.
The plaintiffs furthermore prayed for the imposition and foreclosure of an
equitable lien for that sum on the contract's subject matter, which consisted
of shares of stock of corporations domiciled in the western judicial district
of Missouri. A special appearance was filed by the defendants who moved
that an order authorizing extra-territorial service be vacated and that the
process served upon them outside the district be quashed. The granting of
the motion by the district court' 3 was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit which held: (1) that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this plenary suit because it was bound by the
limitations of Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act; (2) that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants since they were served with
process outside the district. Either basis of the decision seems open to
question.' 4
With regard to the first ground of the decision, it is clear that, although
an ordinary bankruptcy court could not entertain this plenary action without
the defendant's consent, a federal equity receivership court would have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, if the defendants were
within the territorial limits of the court's process.'5 If Congress had ex-
pressly freed reorganization courts acting under Section 77 from the limita-
tions of Section 23, as it did reorganization courts acting under Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act,'6 there would be no question of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the suit. Instead, Congress used the vague terminology
of jurisdiction and powers. The omission of an express exemption, however,
should not have resulted in the interpretation reached by the court in the
instant case, since achievement of the ends of Section 7717 requires that
the reorganization court should have jurisdiction over plenary actions. This
requirement is dictated by the very nature of reorganization procedure. Before
a plan of reorganization can be adopted, the assets of the debtor must be
1936), and First Nat. Bank v. Conway Road Estates Co., 94 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938), merely hold that a reorganization court cannot decide adverse claims in a sum-
mary proceeding. United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co., 86 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936), and Bovay v. Byllesby & Co., 88 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937), hold only
that the court did not have jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants.
13. In re Missouri P. R. R., Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., et al., 24 F. Supp,
724 (E. D. Mo. 1938).
14. On facts similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has apparently recently decided contra. Litigation between New York, N. H. & H. R. R.
and Boston & P. R. R., reported in N. Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1939, p. 39, col. 5-6.
15. See footnote 3 supra.
16. 52 STAT. 883, 11 U. S. C. § 502 (Supp. 1938).
17. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st




ascertained with a fair degree of accuracy. In the principal case, the compu-
tation of assets required resort to a plenary suit. The jurisdiction over these
actions given to receivership courts does not seem to have unduly prejudiced
the rights of the parties or given rise to inordinate hardships. Certainly,
Section 77 should not needlessly be interpreted so as to make reorganization
proceedings less efficient than they were under the old, cumbersome equity
receivership method which the section was designed to replace. And in view
of the similar purposes of Chapter X and Section 77, the jurisdiction of a
railroad reorganization court should be at least as broad as that of an
ordinary corporate reorganization court.
The phraseology of subdivision (1) of Section 77 did not compel the
court to ignore the weight of policy by declaring that there was no juris-
diction over the subject matter. The grant of the powers of an equity
receivership court should have been interpreted to include a grant of the
jurisdiction of such courts,' 8 since it would appear that one of the powers
of an equity receivership court was that of entertaining plenary suits.1 Since
Congress chose to confer upon the reorganization court the powers of both
bankruptcy and equity receivership courts, it would have been more reason-
able to hold that the new court was burdened only by the limitations common
to both.20 The very inclusion within the jurisdictional provisions of the
phrase conferring upon the reorganization court the powers of an equity
receivership court gives rise to the hypothesis that the grant has some
bearing upon the court's jurisdiction."' If the phrase has any relevancy as
a jurisdictional provision, its effect must be that of freeing the reorganization
court from the limitations of Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, since the
court already possessed all other jurisdiction of an equity receivership court
by virtue of its possession of the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court.22
The second ground of the decision was that the court had no jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants because the process served upon them
outside the district was invalid. This holding seems contrary to the mandate
of Congress that: "Process of the court shall extend to and be valid when
served in any judicial district."2 3 The decision is apparently the first sug-
18. See Gerdes, supra note 4, at 272, 278; Developments in the Loa,-Reorgaiduation
Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HA'. L. REv. 1111, 1146; Comment
(1936) 49 HAmi% L. REv. 797, S03, 804. But see Fi..Lv-rzn, Pn.ciPLrEs oF Coaro.ATE
REORGANIZATION (1937) 186-187; F -NuzLr, THE LAW op BANKKntyrUrc REORGANIZATION
(1939) 181-184.
19. See footnote 3 supra.
20. See Gerdes, supra note 4, at 272.
21. In more than one instance, courts seem to have interpreted the provision as con-
ferring the jurisdiction of an equity receivership court. In In re Prima Co., 98 F. (2d)
952, 958 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), it is said that the reorganization court has been granted
"the jurisdiction which a federal court would have, had it appointed an equity receiver
. . ."; see United States et aL. v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co., 86 F. (2d) 363. 369 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1936).
22. See Gerdes, supra note 4, at 271.
23. 49 STAT. 911 (1935); 11 U. S. C. §205 (a) (Supp. 1938).
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gestion that the process provision should be so narrowly interpreted. 4 The
two cases 25 which the court cites as authority for its holding are no authority
at all, since they arose under Section 77B, which contained no provision
authorizing extra-territorial service of process. One of the opinions even
implied2 G that the court would have had jurisdiction if the proceeding had
been under Section 77. The holding in the principal case is especially sur-
prising in view of several cases 27 which have given a very broad scope to
the process power of reorganization courts. In the Rock Island case,28 the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction issued by a railroad reorganization court
restraining non-resident holders of collateral pledged by the debtor from
disposing of the collateral. This decision was rendered before the process
provision was added to Section 77,29 but the court found, "as a necessary
consequence" of its exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's equity in the
pledged collateral, the power to issue its process outside the district to
preserve and safeguard its exclusive jurisdiction.
In the principal case the court expressed the belief that the provision em-
powering the reorganization court to issue valid extra-territorial process
was intended merely to make certain that the court had the means of effec-
tively exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the debtor
wherever located and that it was no more than a statutory confirmation of
the Rock Island decision. But why should Congress frame an amendment
to empower the court to serve valid process outside the district for the
limited purpose of protecting the property of the debtor, when the court
already had the power under the Rock Island decision? If Congress intended
such a narrow interpretation, why did it provide in broad terms that process
of the court shall be valid when served in any judicial district? Section 77
is obviously one of those instances where Congress has exercised its well-
recognized power to provide that process of a federal court shall extend
throughout the country.30 This clearly expressed intent should be effectuated.
24. Discussions have taken it for granted that the provision enabled the court to serve
its process extra-territorially in suits such as the present. FINimizrre, op. cit. supra note
8, at 175; Developmwents in the Law-Reorganzation Under Section 77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1936) 49 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1143.
25. United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co., 86 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936) ; Bovay v. Byllesby & Co., 88 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
26. See United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co., 86 F. (2d) 363, 369 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936).
27. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 294 U. S.
648 (1935) ; In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Thomas
v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp. 839 (W. D. N. Y. 1935); In re Norfolk Weavers, Inc., 12 F.
Supp. 495 (D. Del. 1935).
28. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 294 U. S.
648 (1935).
29. The process provision was added as part of the Act of Aug. 27, 1935, 49 STAT.
911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. §205a (Supp. 1938), which made numerous changes throughout
§ 77. The decision in the Rock Island case was handed down April 1, 1935.
30. Instances of the exercise of this power are given in Robertson v. Railroad Labor
Board, 268 U. S. 619, 624 (1925).
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It may be argued that it is inequitable to compel parties to come into the
reorganization court to defend suits brought by the trustee and that in some
cases it may be cheaper for them to suffer default judgments than to defend
suits far from their residences. The argument, however, has little weight
in view of the fact that there are very few suits brought by railroads or
their trustees on small claims.31 The principal case, which involved over
$3,000,000, cannot be justified on the ground that undue hardship would have
been imposed upon the defendants by compelling them to come into the
reorganization court to present their defenses. The requirement that all
suits agahnst railroads which are undergoing reorganization must be brought
in the reorganization court regardless of the residence of the plaintiff 2 would
seem to impose equal hardship. Yet no serious objections seem to have been
made to it.
The instant decision runs counter to the unquestioned purpose of Section
77 to make reorganization more efficient by centralizing proceedings in one
court. The defendants resided in New York, Cleveland, Kansas City and
St. Joseph, a fact well illustrating the difficulties which will arise from an
unnatural interpretation of the process provision. Unless the process of the
court is held to run throughout the country and the court is given jurisdiction
over plenary actions, separate suits will have to be brought within the venue
of each of these defendants. 33 Considerations of justice, convenience and
economy demand that one court should decide the entire controversy, rather
than that the issues should be disposed of piecemeal in several jurisdictions.
31. Though no statistics appear to be available, a cursory examination of digested
cases indicate that in practically all the cases in which railroads are involved they are
parties defendant. Cases such as the present where the railroad is plaintiff are relatively
rare.
32. The "exclusive jurisdiction" conferred upon the reorganization court by sub-
division (a) of § 77 prevents all other courts from determining controversies relating to
the object of such jurisdiction. See Gerdes, mupra note 4, at 288.
33. Although the plaintiff was permitted under § 57 of the Judicial Code to bring
an action in the western district of 'Missouri, where the property had situs, damages
against the defendants beyond the value of the property could not be rendered in such an
in rent action. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 89 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
Thompson v. Murphy, 93 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). See 36 STr,-. 1102 (1911),
28 U. S. C. § 118 (1934). In suits to enforce liens, service under this provision may be
made outside the district or by publication upon a defendant "not an inhabitant of or
found wvithin the district" Although no lien existed in the principal case before the suit,
a bill to impose and foreclose a lien on the stock and notes in the western district of
Missouri has been held to come under this section. See Spellman v. Sullivan, 61 F. (2d)
787 (C. C A. 2d, 1932) ; 1 Moou's FEDMAL PascricE (1938) §§4.35, 4.37.
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INTEREST OF CREDITORS IN GOODS HELD BY A
BANKRUPT FOR SALE*
A RECENT decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has pointed anew the problems faced by courts in defining the rights of cred-
itors to claim merchandise supplied to an insolvent dealer under contracts
reserving title in the manufacturer.' For some years the defendant had sold
flour to the bankrupt for manufacture and sale as macaroni; but as the finan-
cial condition of the bankrupt had grown unstable, the defendant made a
contract with the bankrupt that the latter thereafter in their dealings was to
act as defendant's agent, without title to the flour, and that the proceeds upon
sale were to be kept separate for the defendant's account. In spite of the
strict terms of the contract, however, the course of business between the
two parties remained substantially unchanged. In an action by the trustee in
bankruptcy against defendant to recover damages for conversion of assets of
the bankrupt, the circuit court reversed a directed verdict for the defendant,
holding that, inasmuch as the parties had not actually carried out the terms
of the contract, 2 the transaction was really one of absolute sale, and under
the law of New York,' the reservation of title was void as to creditors.
4
Such attempts to reserve title are popular; reflecting the efforts of manu-
facturers to bolster a dealer's credit by continuing to supply goods to pre-
serve the dealer's business as a distributing unit, and at the same time to
avoid loss of the merchandise in the dealer's bankruptcy by maintaining the
equivalent of a secret lien against his creditors. 5 Contracts which have been
* Louis Liebowitz, as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Peter Cassinelli Macaroni Co., Inc.
v. Frank Voiello, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 2, 1939, p. 1915, col. 1 (C. C. A. 2d, Nov. 13, 1939).
1. Liebowitz v. Voiello, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 2, 1939, p. 1915, col. I (C. C. A. 2d, Nov.
13, 1939).
2. The provisions of the contract are discussed in note 25 infra.
3. The trustee in bankruptcy may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of his prop-
erty which any creditor might have avoided. Creditors' rights are determined by apply-
ing the law of the state in which the bankruptcy court sits. 52 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U.
S. C. §§ 110 (a), (e) (Supp. 1938). Hence variations in results among the federal courts
are common. Hewitt v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296 (1904). For a criticism
of this rule, see ELKUS AND GLENN, SECRET LIENS AND REPUTED OWNERSHIP (1910)
§ 29.
4. In the following cases, relied on by the court in the principal case, attempted
agencies were held to be absolute sales: Taylor v. Fram, 252 Fed. 465 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918) ; Yarm v. Lieberman, 46 F. (2d) 464 (E. D. N. Y. 1931). See also In re Leflys,
229 Fed. 695 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916) ; In re Carpenter, 125 Fed. 831 (N. D. N. Y. 1903).
The leading case on the point, in which an agency contract was sustained, is Ludvigtl v.
American Woolen Co., 231 U. S. 522 (1913).
5. Attempts to reserve title because of the unstable credit of those with whom the
manufacturer is obliged to deal, were first made in marketing farm supplies in agricul-
tural regions. If the manufacturer extended credit on outright sales, he was likely to
lose the goods to creditors and have only a valueless action against the judgment-proof
dealer. See Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price M1aintenance, II (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 441;
VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNMSHIP (1923) 142 et seq. Similar attempts are general in com-
mission merchandising of perishable foods. 1 NEWTON, PRACTICAL AND LEGAL AsPEcTS
OF CONSIGNMENT MARKETING (1935) 1-3. In some cases this method of distribution may
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devised to serve these purposes vary widely in detail, but most of them re-
semble chattel mortgages, conditional sales, agencies and bailments for sale,
or trust receipts. Analysis of decisions disposing of these agreements indi-
cates that often cases have been decided by fitting the device into the technical
category it most resembles, the rights of creditors being defined according to
principles applicable to that category. This strict conceptualism has fre-
quently led courts to overlook the important fact that in all these contracts
there has been a uniform purpose-to create a secret reservation of title. Dis-
regard of this common denominator has produced variations in results, even
within a single jurisdiction,0 which seem clearly unjustified in view of the
uniform public policy against secret liens. Furthermore, a curious omission
.by the legislature in the New York Conditional Sales Act7 has contributed
to the confusion in that state. The difficulties in which the courts now find
themselves may be effectively illustrated by analyzing in turn each of the
categories into which these transactions have been fitted.
First, the manufacturer who supplies goods to a failing concern is not
likely to conform his contract to a chattel mortgage, since an unrecorded
chattel mortgage is void as to all creditors in New York, and as to lien cred-
itors in most other states.8 Publicity of recordation is not desired, because
it may accelerate the destruction of the dealer's credit, and consequently his
value to the manufacturer as a distributor.0 Furthermore, even a recorded
agreement which gives the mortgagor power to sell the mortgaged property
is fraudulent per se as to creditors in New York, unless the proceeds are
retained by the mortgagor in a separate fund and a strict accounting rendered
the mortgagee---conditions too stringent for the average commission mer-
chant." The method provided by statute in New York for avoiding this
rigid rule is likewise of little value to the manufacturer, since it protects a
mortgagee only after compliance with burdensome and virtually impossible
be more profitable to the manufacturer, apart from the improvement in his position as
against the dealer's creditors. Id., at 2. For devices used to accomplish similar purposes
in instalment selling, see Adelson, Mechanics of the Instalnent Credit Sale (1935) 2
LAW & CONTP. PROB. 218.
6. Although this Note is mainly concerned with the treatment of the problem in
New York, much of the case law of that state is typical, and the ideas developed here
have general application.
7. N. Y. PExs. PRop. LAW §§ 60.80. See p .... and note 20 infra.
8. N. Y. LIEx LAW §§ 230, 230-a. For the rule in other states, see 3 Jo:is, CHAT-
TEL M1ORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (Bower's ed. 1933) §§245, 245a. In states
where only lien creditors are protected the manufacturer may secure a secret lien by
delaying recordation. Ibid. The use of such a device is unlikely, however, for the manu-
facturer would not be willing to assume the risk involved.
9. This motive has been frequently noticed by the courts. See In re Eichengreen,
18 F. (2d) 101, 103 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927).
10. Slilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790 (1906) ; Hangen v. Hachemeis-
ter, 114 N. Y. 566, 21 N. E. 1046 (1889); Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214 (18,3);
Boice v. Finance Co., 127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591 (1920). The rule in other states is
discussed in 2 Joxzs, op. cit. supra note 8, at §459; Note (1927) 49 A. L IL 1495.
11. The lax business methods and irresponsibility of commission merchants are dis-
cussed in 2 NmrmoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 43.
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notification requirements as to each of the dealer's creditors. 12 At common
law in New York the rule was equally strict: the lien of a mortgagee who
permitted the sale of the mortgaged goods in the regular course of trade was
void as to creditors.' 3
More frequently, the manufacturer has resorted to a conditional sale, re-
serving title to the goods until they are sold and paid for by the dealer. 14 In
states having statutes rendering conditional sales void as to creditors unless
filed, 15 a decision that the intentionally unfiled contract is a conditional sale
defeats the purpose of the manufacturer. Under the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, an unfiled conditional sale is invalid as to lien creditors regardless
of whether the parties contemplate a resale.' 6 But in New York, owing to
a peculiar omission in the statute, it seems that the manufacturer who uses
an unrecorded conditional sale for resale would be successful against cred-
itors of the dealer. The provisions of the Uniform Act as to conditional sales
for resale were not adopted in that state. Section 65 of the New York statute
declares unfiled conditional sales void as to creditors of the vendee, but, un-
like the Uniform Act, excepts conditional sales for resale from the opera-
tion of that section.' 7 Section 69 provides for conditional sales for resale,
declaring them "valid whether filed or not except that the reservation of
property shall be void against purchasers from the buyer in good faith for
value and without actual knowledge of the condition of such contract."' 8
An unfiled agreement of conditional sale is therefore valid as to creditors if
it be for resale, but invalid if resale is not expressly or impliedly provided.
This result is directly contrary to the common law rule in New York de-
claring that a conditional sale for resale is fraudulent as a matter of law
with respect to creditors as well as innocent purchasers, because resale is con-
sidered inconsistent with the ownership of the vendor and a fraud upon cred-
12. N. Y. LIEN LAW § 230-a. In In re Rosom Utilities, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 626 (E. D.
N. Y. 1938) the argument that Section 230-a does not apply to a purchase-money mort-
gage seems indefensible.
13. Divver & Gunton v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596 (N. Y. 1829). And see cases
cited supra note 10.
14. Some courts and writers argue that since both chattel mortgages and conditional
sales are security devices there is no real distinction between them. "It seems to me a
barren distinction . . . that tiile does not pass upon a conditional sale; 'title' is a formal
word for a purely conceptual notion; I do not know what it means and I question whether
anybody does, except perhaps legal historians." L. Hand, J., dissenting in In re Lake's
Laundry, Inc., 79 F. (2d) 326, 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). But see Glenn, The Conditional
Sale at Common Law and as a Statutory Security (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 559, 570.
15. Various recording requirements applying to conditional sales are enforced in at
least forty-two states. For a survey of these statutes, see 3 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 8,
§§ 1008-1056. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act has been adopted in at least ten states
since it was introduced in 1919. Ibid.
16. UNFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §§ 5, 9. 2 GREEN, UNIFORm LAWs ANNo-
TATED (1922) 6. Since only lien creditors are protected against unfiled conditional sales
under the Uniform Act, delayed filing might enable the manufacturer to maintain a secret
lien. Morey & Co. v. Schaad et al., 98 N. J. L. 799, 121 At. 622 (1923). But this de-
vice seems impracticable. See note 8 supra.
17. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 65.
18. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 69.
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itors of the vendee. 19 Section 64 reinforces this ludicrous result by stating
that "every . . .conditional sale.., shall be valid as to all persons, except
as hereinafter otherwise provided."20
Thus in New York, legislative omission has contributed to confusion in
the treatment of secret liens. But in most jurisdictions the reaction of the
courts to manufacturers' efforts to evade creditors by relying on doctrines
of agency has been a source of even greater contradiction. The manufac-
turer has attempted to draw contracts enabling him to preserve against the
dealer the absolute obligation to pay of a conditional sale, and at the same
time to escape creditors by declaring the dealer to be a mere agent without
title to the goods in his possession. Since possession implied ownership at
common law, possession for sale without ownership was in bad faith on its
face and created a false credit.21 But goods held by the bankrupt as agent
or bailee were not available to creditors, such possession for sale being doc-
trinally consistent with the ownership of the principal.2m Furthermore, a
bailment with permission to sell was not generally created as a security de-
vice for a prolonged course of dealing.23 The courts are not prone to pierce
the doctrine by noticing the probability that goods held by a bankrupt, who
has not advertised himself as agent, may create a false credit as easily as
goods subject to a secret lien; and the argument that the dealer is an agent
has been persuasive.
2-4
19. In re Garcewich, 115 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902) ; Smith v. Mishawala Woolen
Mfg. Co., 172 Fed. 98 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909) (applying the law of Vrsconsin); Troy
Wagon Works v. Hancock, 152 Fed. 605 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906) (applying law of Indiana);
In re Agnew, 178 Fed. 478 (S. D. Miss, 1909); Devlin v. O'Neill, 6 Daly 305 (N. Y.
1875), aff'd, 68 N. Y. 622 (1877); Ludden v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 650 (N. Y. 1860); cf.
Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869).
But the majority rule is contra. Mishav aka Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Westver, 191 Fed.
465 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); UNIFORMS CONDITIONAL S.um.s AcT §§ 5, 9.
It seems that in New York a conditional sale for manufacture may be valid at common
law against creditors although a conditional sale for resale is void. Prentiss Tool and
Supply Co. v. Schirmer, 136 N. Y. 305, 32 N. E. 849 (1,92); Barrett v. Pritchard, 2
Pick. 512 (Mass. 1824).
20. N. Y. Paas. PRop. Law §§ 64, 65, 69. Apparently the legislature desired to imi-
tate the form of the Uniform Act by treating conditional sales for resale in a separate
section, but to extend its protection by incorporating in that section the New York com-
mon law; thus safeguarding both creditors and innocent purchasers regardless of filing,
in a section where the Uniform Act follows the majority rule and protects only innocent
purchasers when the contract is filed. Hence conditional sales for resale were exempted
from the general rule in Section 65, which leaves all conditional sales valid as to cred-
itors if filed, but by error creditors were omitted from the protection intended to be
given in Section 69.
21. Twyne's Case, 3 Co. 80 b (K. B. 1601).
22. Ex Parte Wingfield, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 591 (1879) ; Mace v. Cadell, 1 Cowp. 232
(K. B. 1774) (agency for sale not within English "reputed ownership" statute, (1623)
21 Jac. 1, ch. 19, §§ 10, 11) ; MlcCullough v. Porter, 4 W. & S. 177 (Pa. 1842).
23. See note 22 supra. See Comment (1932) 31 Mica. L. RZn. 553, 562.
24. Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U. S. 522 (1913); Sturm v. Boker, 150
U. S. 312 (1893); In re Klein, 3 F. (2d) 375 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); In re Galt, 120 red.
64 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903) ; Baker v. New York Nat. Exchange Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 2 N. .
452 (1885); Cole v. Mann, 62 N. Y. 1 (1875).
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However, the manufacturer has been unwilling to assume full responsi-
bility as a principal, and most contracts relying on an agency to thwart cred-
itors have included provisions resembling an absolute or conditional sale to
the dealer rather than an "agency" or "consignment." Although the good
faith of the manufacturer in declaring that the dealer is an agent is the test
the courts purport to apply in determining the validity of such hybrid
schemes, 25 the manufacturer has been permitted in some degree to be a
vendor with respect to the dealer, and at the same time to be protected against
creditors as a principal. 26 When the dealer must keep and pay for goods un-
sold, or when he may mingle the proceeds of goods sold with his own funds,
it is generally held that the dealer is not an agent."7 But contracts requiring
the dealer to keep goods unsold at the option of the manufacturer, 2 or per-
mitting him to fix selling prices over which the manufacturer has no con-
trol,20 are sustained as agencies, although it seems clear, as the court suggested
in the principal case, that there is no agency in good faith in the strict sense,
and that the manufacturer is a party to a device which may enable the dealer
to obtain a false credit.30 From the practical point of view of creditors,
25. Cases applying the good faith standard are cited supra note 24. Bad faith may
appear in two ways: (1) the contract may reveal an intent to set up a bona fide agency,
but if the parties do not carry out the contract the transaction will be judged by what
they actually did. Liebowitz v. Voiello, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 2, 1939, p. 1915, col. 1 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1939) ; Taylor v. Fram, 252 Fed. 465 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
Even though the parties carry out the contract its terms may reveal that no bona fide
agency was actually intended. In the principal case, Liebowitz v. Voiello, supra, even
if the provisions of the contract had been carried out there would be some doubt as to
its validity with respect to creditors, since failure to include provisions for return of flour
unsold or segregation of proceeds would suggest bad faith.
26. Contracts providing for this dual position were sustained as to creditors in the
cases cited infra note 28. But some courts have refused to tolerate such agreements. In re
Roellich, 223 Fed. 687 (D. Ore. 1915). In Snelling v. Arbuckle Bros., 104 Ga. 362, 365,
30 S. E. 863 (1898) the court said the contract "appears to have been drawn for the
purpose of enabling Arbuckle Bros. to 'run with the hare or hold with the hounds' ac-
cording as, in the exigencies of a given case, their interests might dictate."
27. Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U. S. 522 (1913); Notes (1929) 63 A.
L. R. 355, (1922) 17 A. L. R. 1421.
28. McCallum v. Bray-Robinson Clothing Co., 24 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928);
Mitchell Wagon Co. v. Poole, 235 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
29. This provision is very common. The majority rule declares that there is an
agency even though the dealer has complete control over the resale price. Ludvigh v.
American Woolen Co., 231 U. S. 522 (1913). The English rule is contra. See the thor-
ough analysis in Ex parte White, L. R. 6 Chanc. App. 397 (1870).
30. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has shown sonic impatience
with this result. Thus in Liebowitz v. Voiello, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 2, 1939, p. 1915, col. I
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939), the court said: "It is not readily apparent why any consignment
arrangement is not a secret lien against creditors of a shaky consignee, as harmful as an
unfiled chattel mortgage or conditional sale." See also comment of L. Hand, J. (now
Circuit Judge) in In re Weisl et al., 300 Fed. 635, 639 (S. D. N. Y. 1924). In Liebowitz
v. Voiello, supra, the court deemed itself bound by Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co.,
231 U. S. 522 (1913). A reconsideration of that decision seems desirable in the light of
the argument in the text. There has been a significant shift in public policy in favor of
creditors in this type of situation, especially with respect to conditional sales, since the
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there is little difference between these arrangements and an outright sale sub-
ject to a purchase-money mortgage: both are security devices. This ten-
dency to uphold "agency" contracts, which are as likely to deceive creditors
as unfiled conditional sales or chattel mortgages, suggests that in the appli-
cation of the good faith standard to consignment devices the courts have con-
ceded too much to the pressure of business practice. The attention of the
court is often centered on the relation between the dealer and the manufac-
turer, leaving the actual position of creditors a secondary factor.
A possible rationale for a rule more favorable to creditors lies in the equit-
able doctrine of estoppel. The dealer's possession may be considered a rep-
resentation by the manufacturer that he has no prior lien, which he is estopped
to deny in the face of a creditor who has acted in reliance on the reputed
ownership of the dealer.31 But the precedents applying the bad faith standard
are numerous, and the courts do not usually initiate reforms of long-standing
rules, however desirable they may be. A more practicable alternative is sug-
gested by statutes like that of Virginia, which declare that goods held by the
agent are available to his creditors unless he publishes the name of his prin-
cipal in the newspapers and on a sign posted conspicuously at his place of
business. 32 The public policy against secret liens, which produced the statutes
declaring the validity of chattel mortgages and conditional sales contingent
on recordation, applies with equal force to consignment arrangements, which
in this situation are analogous to secret liens. The welfare of commission
merchandising does not require that the manufacturer be permitted to de-
ceive creditors by clothing the dealer with the indicia of ownership.
The extension in the use of trust receipts to domestic transactions, notably
in financing the distribution of automobiles, suggests another alternative
possibly open to the manufacturer which involves no risk to him.34 He may
sell the goods to a bank or other financing agent which advances the price
as the proceeds of a loan to the dealer. In return for the dealer's trust re-
ceipt reserving title in the bank as security for the loan, the dealer is per-
mitted to hold the goods for sale. The Second Circuit has recognized that the
bank has merely a security interest in the goods, and has sustained the title
of the bank whenever it procures the goods from a party other than the
seller, on the theory that a trust receipt is sui gencris: neither a chattel mort-
gage nor a conditional sale.35 However it has been effectively argued that
Ludvigh decision. Other lower federal courts have been reluctant to follow the doctrine
there stated. See Note (1929) 63 A. L. R. 355, 374.
31. The doctrine is discussed in ELKUS AN-D GLENN, Op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 39-52.
32. V A. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1936) § 5224. Maryland, Mississippi and
West Virginia have adopted similar statutes. MD. ANx. CODE (Bagley, 1924) art. 2,
§§ 18, 20; MIss. CODE An. (1930) § 3352; W. V.%. Cour AN:. (Michie & Sublett,
1937) § 4654.
33. This development is discussed in LLEwELLYN, CAsEs ON SAxs (1930) 763-765.
For the authoritative general treatment of trust receipts, see Frederick, The Tru'st Re-
ceipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 395.
34. It should be noted, however, that the value of the trust receipt device to the manu-
facturer in a situation similar to that in the principal case may be greatly decreased by
the reluctance of banks to engage in credit transactions with a small merchant whoze
credit rating is not high.
35. In re James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
1940]
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the possibility of deception of third parties is not less when the bank acquires
title from a third party than when the goods are shipped directly to the
dealer who gives security title to the bank.30 Yet the latter device is in-
valid,3 7 whereas the former is frequently sustained. As in the consignment
cases the criterion deciding creditors' rights is less concerned with the real
position of the creditors than with the relations between the parties to the
agreement. 38 A modification in doctrine looking to the limitation of the do-
mestic use of trust receipts, 30 or the enactment of recording statutes applica-
ble to them,40 seems desirable. Such action would be in accord with the
public policy protecting creditors against unfiled conditional sales, and in
conjunction with the reform suggested with respect to agency contracts would
go far toward achieving the uniform treatment of the problem which appears
desirable.41
TRANSFER OF ASSETS PENDING STAY OF EXECUTION AS
CONTEMPT OF COURT*
THE judgment debtor who strips himself of his assets pending a stay of
execution seriously hampers the successful litigant in the enforcement of his
judgment. Transfer of property by a debtor under such circumstances will
give the judgment creditor an action for fraudulent conveyance;1 but to
secure the benefit of his judgment in such an action the creditor must dis-
cover the grantee and prove a case of fraud. Since this means of recovery
is often slow and cumbersome, judgment creditors have occasionally sought
36. See WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 338a.
37. In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 282 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
38. This approach is illustrated in Federal Finance Corp. v. Reed, 296 Fed. 1 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1924).
39. See LLEWELLYN, Op. cit. supra note 33, 765.
40. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, which provides that unrecorded trust receipts
are invalid as against a trustee in bankruptcy, has been adopted in nine states, including
New York. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 51, 58 (3) (a). And see 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNO-
TATED (Supp. 1938) 214.
For criticism of application of recording requirements to trust receipts, see Hanna,
Trust Receipts (1931) 19 CALIF. L. REv. 257, 273; Comment (1933) 31 Micu. L. REv.
558, 563.
41. This discussion assumes the major premise of the courts: that possession of
goods by dealers without title will mislead creditors. But increasing use of credit bureau
ratings suggests that in fact creditors may not be misled by secret liens as frequently as
the doctrine assumes. However, such revaluation of fundamental assumptions behind
hostility to secret liens must await further research into business practice, and is beyond
the scope of this Note. See LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 33, 765.
*Berry v. Midtown Service Corporation, 104 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert.
granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 114 (U. S. 1939).
1. Maasch v. Parkin ct al., 58 App. Div. 560, 69 N. Y. Supp. 187 (2d Dep't 1901).
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an alternative remedy through a civil contempt citation against the debtor;' on
the theory that the employment by the latter of a stay of execution as a
respite in which to effect a fraudulent conveyance carries a definite connota-
tion of affront to the court, and that inherent in the court's order of stay is
a direction that the parties must maintain the status quo and do nothing
during that time to jeopardize each other's position.3 More specifically, the
defendant is alleged to be subject to an implied order not to impair his
financial responsibility.4
The desirability of a contempt citation under these circumstances stems
from the fact that the contemnor is ordered to pay a fine to the injured party
as indemnity.5 In the case of a transfer of assets the fine will be the amount
of the judgment which was rendered ineffective. Should this remedial fine
not be paid, the contemnor will be committed to prison until payment is made.0
Thus contempt proceedings, resulting in the summary recovery of the value
of the judgment under threat of imprisonment, become in these instances a
most effective creditor's remedy.
In a recent case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
a judgment creditor, whose debtor had transferred his assets pending a stay
of execution, sought to utilize this contempt procedure.7 The court, however,
held the remedy inappropriate, on the ground that the acts complained of
did not constitute "disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command" as required by the Federal Contempt
Statute.8 Construing the Statute as restrictive legislation and expressing
itself as bound by its terms, the court refused to include within its provisions
orders allegedly existing only by implication.
Both the language of the Statute9 and its historical background 0 lend sup-
port to this strict interpretation, but such literal compliance has not always
2. Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (N. D. Cal. 1921); Gresswdll v. O'Rourhe, 163
N. Y. Supp. 580 (Sup. Ct 1917). On the difference between civil and criminal contempt,
see Note (1936) 46 YAI. L. J. 326.
3. Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (N. D. Cal. 1921).
4. Jedeikin v. Long, 154 Misc. 835, 278 N. Y. Supp. 464 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
5. Dakota Corp. v. Slope County, 75 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935); Campbell
et a!. v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 65 F. (2d) 425 (C. C.A. 8th, 1933); Campbell
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators, 151 Minn. 23S, 126 N. NV. 787 (1922).
6. Landry v. Landry, 215 App. Div. 316, 213 N. Y. Supp. 671 (1st Dep't 1926),
RAPALIE, CoNrr-= (1884) § 130.
7. Berry v. Midtown Service Corp., 104 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert.
granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 114 (U. S. 1939).
8. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §385 (1934).
9. "The said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths,
and to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their
authority. Such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any
cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said
courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such
officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person to any lawful vrit, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts."
10. The Statute in its present form was passed in 1831 following the impeachment
trial of District Judge Peck. The judge had cited one Lawless for contempt as punish-
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been shown. The doctrine that the contempt power is inherent in the courts
has weakened the effect of legislative restrictions on it." In United States
v. Toledo Newspaper Company,12 a case involving contempt by publication,
the Supreme Court stated that the Statute was merely declaratory and "con-
ferred no powers not already granted, and imposed no limitations not already
existing."' 3 This interpretation was followed in Lineker v. Dillon,14 a district
court case, where there had been a transfer of assets pending a stay of execu-
tion. No order to maintain the status quo had been issued, but, interpreting
the Statute broadly, the court held that such an order was implied from the
stay, and the judgment debtor was held in contempt for its violation tinder
the court's inherent contempt power unrestrained by the Statute. The court
in the Berry case, however, declined to follow Lineker v. Dillon, differing
both as to the construction of the Statute, and specifically, as to whether the
transfer was in contempt. Even though the Berry case did not involve con-
tempt by publication, about which the history and subsequent interpretation
of the Statute have centered, its view of the Statute as being restrictive
is a pertinent and commendable reflection of a judicial attitude towards the
general function of the legislation.' 5
ment for a publication adversely criticizing an opinion. The impeachment failed, but
public opinion, remembering the alien and sedition laws, demanded a legislative check on
further abuses of the summary power. The result was the present Statute. See Frank-
furter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"
Federal Courts (1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publi-
cation in the United States (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 401, 525, THOMAS, PRODLEZS OF
CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934).
11. Any historical basis for the doctrine of "inherent power" has been removed by
Sir John Fox in THE HISTORY OF CONTFrPT OF COURT (1927), where it is shown that
contrary to the assertions of Blackstone [4 BL. Com. *286] "immemorial usage" does
not sustain the power. Nevertheless courts still reassert the doctrine, as its convenience
impels its retention. The federal statute has succumbed to this doctrine by having the
"so near thereto" clause construed to refer to obstructive effect rather than physical
proximity. See THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 64. See also Comment (1938) 48 YALE
L. J. 54, at 58.
12. 247 U. S. 402 (1918).
13. See Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565, 572 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911) where the
Statute is said to be a legislative assertion of the inherent contempt power of the courts.
14. 275 Fed. 460 (N. D. Cal. 1921).
15. The relegation of the Statute to declaratory impotency has been heartily criticized
as a clear departure from its plain meaning and intent. See Frankfurter and Landis
supra note 10, at 1029, and Nelles and King supra note 10, at 543.
In Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U. S. 1873) the Supreme Court construed the
Statute as a valid restriction on the contempt powers of the inferior federal courts. Tie
construction in the Toledo Newspaper case was given without reference to Ex parte
Robinson. The later date of the Toledo Newspaper case may give it a stronger position
as authority, yet the true status of the statute is still doubtful. In Morgan v. United
States, 95 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) the interpretation in Ex parte Robinson was
followed, and the assertion was made that it did not appear that the Supreme Court had
ever receded from its interpretation in that case. For other instances of strict interpreta-
tion since the Toledo Newspaper case, see McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.
(2d) 211, 213 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Wilson v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 215, 218
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
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NOTES
Apart from general interpretation of the Statute, the specific point at issue
in the instant case, namely, whether the implied order to maintain the status
quo could have been included within the meaning of the statutory term "order,"
is dependent upon a consideration of the status of implied orders in contempt
proceedings. There is authority for punishing as contempt, in the absence
of any actual order, acts in the nature of a disobedience, but except for
decisions in New York,16 which has a broad contempt statute,17 the instances
where it has been done involved different operative facts from those in the
Berry and Lineker cases. 'Where a person anticipates the issuance of an order
and proceeds to do that which the order will forbid, such an act has been held
a contempt. In Ex Parte Kellogg'8 the contemnor had been the defendant
in an action to require the turning over of certain personal property to the
sheriff. He secured a continuance, and in that time disposed of the property
in anticipation of an adverse order. In State cx rel. Morse v. District Courti
0
a chief of police was held in contempt for the delivery of a prisoner to ex-tra-
dition messengers in anticipation of the service of a writ of habeas corpus.
In these cases there is the element of an inchoate order and an anticipatory
breach of its terms. Neither element can be found in the Berry case. Further,
the destruction or removal pending suit of the subject matter of the litigation,
thereby rendering any forthcoming judgment meaningless, has been held a
contempt.20 Here, though no actual order has been issued, some specific
property constructively in the custody of the court is involved. It has also
been held that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy effects an attachment of
the debtor's property, and hence a subsequent transfer is a contempt.2 1 How-
ever, the stay of execution in the situation presented by the Berry case is
not so analogous to a petition in bankruptcy as to compel the conclusion
that such an encumbrance attaches to the assets of the judgment debtor.
16. Gresswell v. O'Rourke, 163 N. Y. Supp. 5SO (Sup. Ct. 1917); Advance Piece
Dye Works, Inc. v. Zeller, 150 Misc. 903, 270 N. Y. Supp. 487 (N. Y. City Ct. 1934) ;
Silverman v. Seneca Realty Co., 154 fisc. 35, 276 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Jedeikin v. Long, 154 Misc. 835, 278 N.Y. Supp. 464 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Contra: Dollard
v. Koronsky, 67 Misc. 90, 121 N. Y. Supp. 937 (Sup. Ct. 1910), aff'd, 13S App. Div.
213, 123 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1st D~p't 1910), aff'd, 199 N. Y. 558, 93 N. E. 1119 (1910).
17. N. Y. JuD. LAW § 753.
18. 64 Cal. 343, 30 Pac. 1030 (1383).
19. 29 Mont. 230, 74 Pac. 412 (1903).
20. Merrimack Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U. S. 527 (1911) (removal of telegraph
equipment from streets pending appeal from dismissal of bill to restrain removal);
Wartman v. Wartman, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,210 (C. C. D. Md. 1853) (disposition of trust
corpus by party in possession pending determination of rights in it) ; Bartholomay Breving
Co. v. O'Brien, 172 App. Di. 734, 159 N. Y. Supp. 126 (4th Dep't 1916), aff'd, 220
N. Y. 587, 115 N. E. 1033 (1917) (sublease of premises pending action to establish a
lien and foreclose same upon a liquor tax certificate) ; Vinichi v. Silverman, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (retransfer of automobiles pending action to set aside transfer
to defendant); But cf. Dakota Corp. v. Slope County, 75 F. (2d) 5S4 (C. C. A. 8th,
1935).
21. Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 335 (C. C.A. 8th, 1910) (interference by third part);
In re Mfardenfield, 256 Fed. 920 (N. D. N. Y. 1919) (sale and appropriation by bank-
rupt). Contra: In re Probst 205 Fed. 512 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
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Finally, where a court has issued a decree declaring a property status, it has
been held in some cases that any acts inconsistent with such a declaration
are in contempt.22 This issue arises especially in cases of water rights where
a party appropriates more than his decreed share.23 Although none of these
authorities present a square analogy, they do represent the doctrine that a
formal order is not an invariable requisite.
In spite of these cases where a formal order has been dispensed with,
there is considerable authority to indicate that such an order will generally
be required. It has been held that contempt will lie only for disobedience
to what is decreed, not to what may be decreed ;24 further that there must
be a disobedience to a decree or order in existence.25 Even where there has
been the issuance of an actual order, courts will not cite for contempt unless
the acts alleged to constitute the disobedience fall clearly within the acts
enjoined. 26 It is necessary that the order cover the act; expansion of an
existent decree by implication is improper.27 It .is difficult to reconcile such
strictness with theories implying an order in its entirety. The cases where
this has been done are better viewed as exceptions to the general principle
requiring the order to be express.
Where a court process has been used as an opportunity to effectuate fraud,
it can readily be argued that the court as well as the party aggrieved has
an interest in rectifying the damage. However, there is a certain harshness
in an extension of the practice of using the contempt power to punish a dis-
obedience to an order which was in fact never expressly issued. In the stay
of execution cases the order is said to exist by implication; yet an order to
the plaintiff not to levy execution is far from an obvious basis for implying
an order to the defendant to conserve his assets. Moreover, the efficacy of
the remedy in the hands of the creditor depends on the removal of certain
protections normally given the debtor: jury trial is dispensed with and the
22. In Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 217 Pac. 73 (1923) where the
court declared a party to be owner of certain stock and entitled thereto, the officers of
the corporation refused to cancel the certificate of the prior owner and issue a new one
to the successful litigant. They were held not to be in contempt as the order only
declared a right and gave no direction to them.
23. State ex rel. Zosel v. District Court, 56 Mont. 578, 185 Pac. 1112 (1919) ; Ophir
Creek Water Co. v. Ophir Hill Consolidated Mining Co., 61 Utah 551, 216 Pac. 490
(1923). Contra: Albrethson v. Ensign, 32 Idaho 687, 186 Pac. 911 (1920).
24. Ex parte Buskirk, 72 Fed. 14 (C. C. A. 4th, 1896) ; In re Probst, 205 Fed. 512
(C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
25. United States v. Day, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,934 (C. C. D. N.J. 1858); Federal
Trade Commission v. Fairyfoot Products Co., 94 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938);
Epstein v. American Hammond Piston Ring Co., 95 N. J. Law 391, 113 Ati. 319 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
26. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis et al. v. United States, 266 U. S. 17 (1924)
In re Cary, 10 Fed. 622 (S. D. N.Y. 1882); McFarland v. United States, 295 Fed. 648
(C. C. A. 7th, 1924) ; It re Miller and Harbaugh, 54 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ;
Mitchell v. Sperling, 229 App. Div. 204, 241 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1st Dep't 1930); North
et al. v. Foley, 149 Misc. 572, 267 N. Y. Supp. 572 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
27. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis et al. v. United States, 266 U. S. 17 (1924);
Lustgarten v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 92 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
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creditor gains the ultimate sanction of subjecting the debtor to imprisonment.
Then too, the implied order to maintain the status quo effects an attachment
of the debtor's property during the stay. Logically, a conveyance by the
debtor need not even be fraudulent, as a transfer which impairs financial
responsibility is a violation of a duty to maintain the status quo. In any
event imposition of this duty would postpone an inclination on the part of the
debtor to pay other obligations, through fear of being cited for an alteration
of his financial position. Such substantial advantages should not accrue to
a judgment creditor merely because a stay of execution has been granted the
debtor.
A denial of a remedy in civil contempt on a theory of an implied order to
maintain the status quo does not leave the creditor without protection against
the danger of fraudulent conveyances. The ex\'pedient of a stay bond is avail-
able, and where such security cannot be obtained, a request for an actual
order may be made.28 There is no injustice in refusing to grant such an order
retrospectively for the benefit of one who made no request for it when the
stay was granted.
CANCELLATION OF GROUP INSURANCE POLICY BY EMPLOYER
WITHOUT CONSENT OF EMPLOYEE*
TRE problem of determining the validity of cancellation of a group insur-
ance policy by an employer without the employee's consent had until recently
been uniformly resolved by examining the status of the employee under the
contract between employer and insurer,' and predicating the result on a deter-
mination of whether or not the employee was a party to that contract. The
majority of the courts have held he was not such a party, and have therefore
sustained the cancellation and denied recovery to the named beneficiary.2 A
recent Ohio decision,3 allowing recovery by the use of analogy from old-line4
insurance cases, constitutes a challenge to the validity of the rationale of all
previous decisions on the subject, and to the correctness of the actual results
reached under the majority rule.
In Hinkler v. Equitable Assurancc Society,3 the insured employee, Hink-
ler, held individual certificates under two annual policies of group insurance
28. It must be conceded that such an order might be refused. See Scott v. Neely,
140 U. S. (1891); Martin v. James B. Berry Sons' Co., 83 F. (2d) 857 (C.C.A. 1st,
1936). However, inability invariably to secure such an order on request only militates
further against a doctrine by which the order arises automatically by implication.
*Hintder v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 22 N. E. (2d) 451 (Ohio App. 193S).
1. See note 26 infra. But cf. Butler v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 93 S. IV. (2d) 1019
(MNunic. Ct. Mo. 1936).
2. See note 27 infra.
3. Hinlder v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 22 N. E. (2d) 451 (Ohio App. 193S).
4. The term "old-line" insurance is used in this Note to distinguish cases involving
standard life insurance policies from those dealing wvith group insurance.
5. 22 N. E. (2d) 451 (Ohio App. 1938).
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in which his wife was named as beneficiary. On one policy0 the employer paid
all the premiums; the other was contributory, with the employee paying a
share. Both policies gave the employee the power to change the beneficiary
and the privilege to convert his group insurance to an individual policy if he
left the job. Each certificate clearly stated that it was as much a part of the
insurance contract as was the master policy between employer and insurer.7
When these policies had still some months to run, the employer negotiated
for their termination and the issuance of a new master policy. Upon receiving
notice of cancellation, Hinkler applied for a certificate under the proposed
new policy. He died, however, after the time for paying the last installment
on the old policy had passed, without payment, but within the grace period
which was provided.8 Hinkler's wife, refusing to recognize that Hinkler's
actions in applying for a certificate under the new policy constituted the con-
sent allegedly required for effective cancellation, brought suit on the old poli-
cies.
The court allowed her full recovery. Dismissing as immaterial the differ-
ent rationale of previous group cases on the point, the court adopted the tra-
ditional principle that the beneficiary of an insurance policy has a vested in-
terest which, although defeasible by lapse, 9 may not be destroyed by cancel-
lation.10 Both the employee Hinkler and his wife were regarded as benefi-
ciaries-Hinkler because of the potential benefit he might receive by exer-
cising his privilege to convert to an individual policy-and both were held
in consequence to have rights that the policy should not be cancelled without
their affirmative consent. As to Hinkler, there is support for the court's posi-
tion, at least by inference, in the old-line insurance cases cited in the opinion.
By analogy to the principles of those cases, Hinkler seems to be, as the court
found, a beneficiary under both policies and so a necessary party to their can-
cellation. On the contributory policy he appears, because of his joint financial
responsibility for it, to have, as well, the rights of an insured. On this as-
sumption Hinkler and the employer shared as to one policy the status of in-
sured parties; their right to cancel it was joint, not to be exercised without
the consent of both.
The court, however, did not stop with its determination of Hinkler's status,
but went on to consider whether the wife had independent rights against can-
cellation. Since the power to change the beneficiary was here reserved, it
would seem that the wife could have independent rights against cancellation
only on the authority of those old-line cases holding a beneficiary's rights in
6. The word "policy" will be used in this Note to refer to the master policy be-
tween insurer and employer, not to the individual certificate held by each employee.
7. "This policy [certificate], together with the employer's application therefor . . .
shall constitute the entire contract between.the parties." Brief for Respondent, at 4.
8. The grace clause is acknowledgedly sufficient in lapse cases, to keep the policies
alive for thirty-one days after payment was due. The central issue in the principal case
is whether the employer and insurer can, by cancellation, make this grace clause inoper-
ative.
9. 2 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) 824; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d
ed. 1930) 545.
10. VANCE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 543; 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed.
1928) 6399; 2 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 9, § 308.
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the policy vested until a proper exercise of the power ;"l under the larger
number of cases holding her interest a mere expectancy,' " her consent seems
immaterial. The court, in holding Mrs. Hinkler's consent necessary, ignored
this conflict in the authorities by citing as its only precedent a case in which
the power to change the beneficiary had vot been reserved.13 The instant
case, therefore, provides an unconvincing precedent on this point. A more
convincing argument could be made by distin idshing the expectancy cases:
since the employee was the only one with power to change the beneficiary, it
might well be said that the wife's rights were vested as to the employer, so
that, with regard to cancellation by him, the case would fall within the prin-
ciple of cases in which power to change the beneficiary had not been re-
served. 14 In this case, however, the wife does not need, in order to recover,
an independent right that the policy should not be cancelled without her con-
sent. If it be granted that the policy remained in force because Hinkler's
consent was missing, the wife, whose right to sue for the benefits was vested
by her husband's death,' 3 should recover.
The problem of the wife's independent rights illustrates the complexity
and difficulty of applying traditional insurance law to group insurance. The
mere fact of having another party to the contract prevents any exact parallel
with orthodox insurance cases, except for a very few, which, since they deal
only with the question of insurable interest, provide no precedent.10  The
comparison is further weakened by the fact that the presence of the employer
has considerably changed the status which the employee would have under a
regular policy. The employee has become a limited beneficiary;1 and some
of the normal functions he would have as an insured have been assumed by
the employer.'8 Because of the necessities of a master policy covering a large
number of employees, the employer occupies a curious middle position be-
tween the insurer and employees'9-a position' giving rise to intricate agency
problems with regard to his responsibility for transmission of premiums20
11. -%AxcE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 561.
12. 2 CoUcHa, op. cit. supra note 9, at 825; V.oxcn, op. cit. supra note 9, § 147.
13. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Buxer, 62 Ohio St. 385, 57 N. E. 66 (1900), cted
in Hinkler v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 22 N. E. (2d) 451, 452 (Ohio App. 193S).
14. But see Stoner v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 28 Dauphin Co. Rep. 235, 233 (Pa.
1925).
15. 2 CoucHa, op. cit. supra note 9, at 825; Vo,E. op. di. supra note 9, at 564.
16. See McCann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 177 Mass. 2M0, 58 X. E. 1026 (1901);
Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 174 Mass. 467, 54 N. E. 879 (1899); Burke v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 155 Pa. 295,26 Atl. 445 (1893).
17. Through the potential benefit which might accrue to Hinkler from the enercise
of his conversion privilege. See Hinkler v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 22 N. E. (2d)
451, 453 (Ohio App. 1938).
18. Notably, payment of premiums and initial procurement of the policy.
19. For a detailed discussion of the employer's position in group insurance, see
Hanft, Group Insurance: Its Legal Aspects (1935) 2 LAW & CoI-'am. Pou. 70; and,
in less detail, Comment (1936) 36 CoL. L. Rv. 89.
20. Deduction by the employer of part of the employee's ,vages constitutes payment
to insurer. All States Life Ins. Co. v. Tilman, 226 Ala. 245, 146 So. 393 (1933); D~ese
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 214, 167 S. E. 797 (1933) ; Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
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and notice of loss2' to insurer, and notice of termination of the insurance 2 2
to the employees. These new problems are in part consequences of the indus-
trial character of group insurance. Group insurance is primarily condi-
tioned upon employment factors: its inauguration is largely motivated by the
desire to improve employee morale,23 its amount generally increases with years
of service 2 4 and it ends altogether when the employee loses his job. To meet
the new problems which arise in this complex setting, a new approach to the
insurance contract in group cases seems required.
All courts, in the situation of the instant case, had undertaken such a re-
analysis,2 5 and had approached the problem on a straight contract basis. They
had dealt with the policy as a contract between employer and insurer; but
most courts have failed to regard the employee as a party to the contract, and
have treated him as a third party beneficiary who does not have the rights of
the traditional insurance beneficiary 26 to enforce the policy where cancellation
v. Compton, 73 S. W. (2d) 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). Cf. Sun Life Ass. Co. v. Coker,
187 Ark. 602, 61 S. W. (2d) 447 (1933).
21. The employer is not the insurer's agent for receiving proof of loss. Ammons v.
Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 205 N. C. 23, 169 S. E. 807 (1933).
22. The employee is not entitled to notice of termination of insurance. Beeccey v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 267 Mass. 135, 166 N. E. 571 (1929) ; Magee v. Equitable Life Ass.
Soc., 62 N. D. 614, 244 N. W. 518, 85 A. L. R. 1457 (1932); Thull v. Equitable Life
Ass. Soc., 40 Ohio App. 486, 178 N. E. 850 (1931) (probably overruled by principal
case). But cf. Deese v. Travelers Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 214, 167 S. E. 797 (1933).
Nor is the employee entitled to notice of termination of employment-which termin-
ates the insurance. Colter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 270 Mass. 424, 170 N. E. 407 (1930) ;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lembright, 32 Ohio App. 10, 166 N. E. 586 (1928) (probably
overruled by the principal case). Contra: Emerick v. Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins. Co.,
120 Conn. 60, 179 At. 335 (1935). The question of the employer's intent to discharge
the employee may be left to the jury. Cogsdill v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 S. C.
371, 155 S. E. 747 (1930).
23. CRAWFORD, GROUP INSURANCE (1936) 6; Comment (1936) 36 COL. L. Rnv. 89,
91; (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 166, 168.
24. Hinkler's non-contributory policy automatically increased in amount by one hun-
dred dollars every year for five years. Defendant's brief on motion to certify to Supreme
Court of Ohio, at p. 58.
25. But cf. Butler v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 93 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Munic. Ct.
Mo. 1936).
26. Larocco v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 68 Fed. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933);
Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery, 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94, 55 A. L. R. 1231 (1927); Car-
ruth v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 608, 122 S. E. 226 (1924); Carpenter v. Chicago
R. R., 21 Ind. App. 88, 51 N. E. 493 (1898) ; Peyton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 148
So. 721 (Ct. App. La. 1933) ; Beecey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 267 Mass. 135, 166 N. E. 571
(1929); 8 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 9, § 2094; CRAWFORD, GROUP INSURANCE (1936)
30; Hanft, op. cit. supra note 19, at 85; Comment (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 89, 96; cf.
Emerick v. Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 60, 179 Atl. 335 (1935). Of course
the old-line insurance beneficiary is a mere third party beneficiary himself, but he has been
accorded, for special reasons, rights independent of and adverse to the insured's rights
under the policy. See Vance, Beneficiary in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE
L. J. 343. However, the employee in group insurance, viewed as a third party beneficiary,
is considered to have no rights not specifically provided for his benefit in the insurance
policy. See notes 27, 28 infra.
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is without his consent.2 7 Nor is the employee entitled to notice of cancellation
under the majority rule,28 though he or his appointed beneficiary may sue for
benefits due on the policy.29 It is probably the apparent inequity of denying
recovery on the policy after Hinkler's long reliance20 on it for his insurance,
and his inability to prevent the attempted reduction, that induced the court in
the instant case to rely on the older, vested interest rationale. In order to
avoid inequity, however, it was not necessary to abandon the contract ration-
ale of previous group cases; a better way would have been to follow the lead
of some recent cases in correcting the errors in analysis in the majority rule.2 1
A few courts have properly reasoned that the employee is an implied party to
the insurance contract by virtue of his certificate.32 The consideration neces-
sary to support a contract by Hinkler with the employer and insurer is clearly
present, on the contributory policy, in the premiums paid.33 On the non-con-
27. Austin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 337 (Ct. App. La. 1932) (non-
contributory) ; Stoner v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 28 Dauphin Co. Rep. 235 (Pa. 1925)
(non-contributory) ; Thompson v. Pacific Mills, 141 S. C. 303. 139 S. E. 619 (1927) (non-
contributory); Davis v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 161 Tenn. 655, 32 S. W. (2d) 1034
(1930) (contributory) ; Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Hinkle, 74 S. W. (2d) 1032 (Ct.
App. Tenn. 1934) (contributory). The holding in these cases, however, do not square
with the facts: In the Austin and Stoner cases the policies had lapsed by the time of the
employee's death; in the Thompson and Davis cases a previous recovery had been had on
the new policy; in the Hinkle (and Stoner) cases the employee, having lost his job, was
no longer covered by the insurance. The Davis and Hinkle cases appear, anyway, to be
overruled by Smithart v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 513, 71 S. IV.
(2d) (1934).
But those cases which hold that the employee is not entitled to notice of cancellation
are [see note 22 supra], a fortiori, authority against the proposition that an employee's
consent is required for cancellation. Even where notice is required, on the other hand,
it does not follow that consent must be given. Sowell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 207 N. C. 372,
177 S. E. 15 (1934).
28. See note 22 supra.
29. This rule is universal. The employer need not be made a party to suit against
insurer. See Hamblin v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 124 Neb. 841, 248 N. IV. 397 (1933).
30. For seventeen years Hinkler xas insured under group policies and at the time of
his death carried $10,000 insurance. Brief for Respondent, pp. 1, 2.
31. Or the court might have held the cancellation invalid as an attempt to evade the
spirit of the Ohio Statute which required a grace clause in all insurance contracts. Spen-
cer v. Cleveland Athletic Ass'n, 32 Nisi Prius 369 (Munic. Ct. Ohio 1934). See note 8
supra.
32. Williams v. John Hancock 'Mut. Ins. Co.. 154 Misc. 504, 277 N. Y. Supp. 429
(Sup. Ct. 1935); Smithart v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 513, 71 S. W1.
(2d) 1059 (1934); see Schuerman v. General American Ins. Co., 106 S. I. (2d) 920,
924, (Mlunic. Ct. Mo. 1937); Spencer v. Cleveland Athletic Ass'n, 32 Nisi Prius 369
(Munic. Ct. Ohio 1934) (alternative holding) semble.
33. Williams v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 154 'Misc. 504, 277 X. Y. Supp. 429
(Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Smithart v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 513, 71 S. W. (2d)
1059 (1934) ; CR.wFoRO, op. cit. supra note 23, at 22, 99, 180; Hanft, op. cit. stpra note
19, at 85; Comment (1936) 36 CoL L. REv. S9, at 97, 98, 102; accord, Emerick v. Connecti-
cut Gen'l Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 60, 179 Ati. 335 (1935); Butler v. Equitable Life Ass.
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tributory policy, there would seem to be consideration in the fact that the in-
surance given is partial compensation for services 4-as is emphasized by
the provision for an increase in insurance with each additional year of em-
ployment. There seems, therefore, a sound basis for giving Hinkler, as a
direct party to the contract, rights against cancellation without his consent.
And once this is granted, the wife's right to recover seems clear without any
consideration of whether she had any independent right against cancellation.
She need only show that the policy was still in force at her husband's death,
when her right to recover against the insurance company matured.
The majority of courts in group cases seem justified in avoiding the older
vested interest rationale which is based on fact situations at best superficially
parallel to those in group insurance. Ironically enough, the court in the instant
case achieved by the use of the vested interest analogy a more equitable result
than it could have attained by following the majority rule under the more apt
contract rationale. It would have been just as fair and far more appropriate
had the court followed the minority recent cases, adopting the contract ra-
tionale but considering the employee a party to the insurance contract. This
would have equally protected the parties, but by the use of principles which
seem better suited to the greater complexity of the modern industrial setting
of group insurance.
INTERVENTION BY CREDITOR OF SUBSIDIARY COMPANY IN
REORGANIZATION OF PARENT*
IT was long recognized that, as a device for corporate reorganization, the
equity receivership was deficient in certain important respects. Prominent
among these were the jurisdictional limitations of the reorganization forum,1
and the court's inability to examine the plan of reorganization at an early
stage to insure its feasibility and fairness.2 Section 77B and its successor,
Soc., 93 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Munic. Ct. Mo. 1936) ; see Schuerman v. General American
Insurance Co., 106 S. W. (2d) 920, 924 (Munic. Ct. Mo. 1937).
Today the overwhelming majority of group policies are contributory and the propor-
tion is increasing. 7 ENcYc. Soc. SCIENCES 184 (1932); Comment (1936) 36 COL. L.
REv. 89, 91.
34. Spencer v. Cleveland Athletic Ass'n, 32 Nisi Prius 369 (Munic. Ct. Ohio 1934);
CRAwoRi, op. cit. supra note 23, at 22, 180; Hanft, op. cit. supra note 19, at 85, 86;
Comment (1936) 36 Col L. REv. 89, 98; (1934) 12 N. C. L. Rv. 166, 168; see Thomp-
son v. Pacific Mills, 141 S. C. 303, 139 S. E. 619 (1927) ; cf. First National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 39 B. T. A. 134 (1939).
Or the contract may be based on the employee's action in reliance where he is promised
insurance so long as he stays on the job. Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 90. But see
Colter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 270 Mass. 424, 431, 170 N. E. 407, 409 (1930); Myerson
v. New Idea Hosiery, 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94, 55 A. L. R. 1231 (1927).
* Commercial Cable Staffs' Association v. Robert Lehman et al., C. C. A. 2d, Nov.
20, 1939.
1. 1 GERDES ON CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) § 14.
2. Id. § 16.
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Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, were enacted with the express purpose of
obviating such defects. But a recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit raises a question as to whether in some situations these
statutory provisions have effectuated any real improvement over the technique
of the equity receivership.
Proceedings were instituted under Section 77B for the reorganization of
two holding companies, one of which, the Postal Telegraph and Cable Com-
pany, owned all the common and a substantial part of the preferred stock
in the other, the "Associated Companies." None of the other subsidiaries
or affiliates in the extensive system of which the debtors formed a part had
been technically in reorganization, nor had they at any time submitted them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the court. The plan, however, provided for a
thorough reshuffling of inter-company holdings and properties, which was to
be effected by votes cast by the debtor holding companies as stockholders in
the subsidiaries. Cable Staffs' Association, a body composed of the employees
of one of the subsidiaries, sought to intervene in the reorganization proceed-
ings on the plea that its interests were adversely affected by the proposed
plan.3 It was interested in Commercial Cable Company, its employer, as a
creditor only through certain pension claims, which in a large part depended
upon the existence of profits ;4 it asserted, inter alia,5 that the plan would strip
Commercial of all its liquid assets and thereby render insolvent the new
company which was to succeed it and to assume the pension claims, thus
constituting a conveyance which would be fraudulent as to the trade union.0
3. When the assets of a solvent subsidiary of the debtor are to be sold or trans-
ferred as part of a reorganization plan, unless the creditors of the subsidiary company
suspect some fraud on them, they have no standing to object. RoxLIacH, LAw A:; PRAc-
TICE IN CORmOR CONTROL (1933) 174. But careful provision is generally made in the
plan for satisfying their claims. Cf. In re Warner-Quinlan Co., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 659 (S.
D. N. Y. 1936), (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 863.
4. Although in this Note it will be assumed arguendo that the union members may
properly be called "creditors" of Commercial, their status is actually somewhat ambigu-
ous. There are no accrued liabilities under the pension scheme, since payments are lting
made currently during the reorganization. The pension reserves are not clearly a "lia-
bility;" classified in the books as a reserve, they may best be characterized as a mere
bookkeeping entry. Record on Appeal, p. 206, and Exhibit 16, n. 9. Viewed as parties to
an executory contract-perhaps an unwarranted interpretation, since the employees con-
tribute nothing and the employer reserves the right to change the scheme at any time-
it may be that the employees are not "creditors" until their contract has been rejected.
See BANKRT ,cy ACT § 202, 52 STAT. 893-4 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 602 (Supp. 1938) ; but
cf. the broad definitions of "claims" and "creditor" in § 106 (1), (4), 52 Sr.r. SI3 (1938),
11 U. S. C. § 506(1), (4) (Supp. 1938). Under the debtors' reorganization plan, the pen-
sion schemes are being carried in full onto the books of the new company. Record on
Appeal, pp. 826-7.
5. Its objection that the plan was unfair because of the preponderant control which
it gave to the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., sole common stockholder of
Postal, was not dealt with in the court's opinion. See note 14 infra.
6. A principal feature of the plan is the transfer of the assets of Commercial Cable,
a solvent subsidiary, to weaker parts of the system. The financial relations of Commer-
cial Cable with the two debtors are as follows: Associated owns all the shares in Com-
mercial, and Commercial owes 23 million dollars to Postal and owns 121fq of the pre-
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In the district court, the union lost on the merits. The Second Circuit, speak-
ing through Judge Learned Hand, in a two to one decision, dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the union was not a
"creditor" of either debtor subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and hence
should not have been allowed to intervene.7
The majority suggests that assumption of jurisdiction might be proper
if necessary to prevent "palpable fraud." But from an examination of probable
Congressional intent as revealed in the statute, it concludes that exercise of
jurisdiction in this case would unduly expand the meaning of Section 77B
(and Chapter X); and that, insofar as the scope of the equity powers of a
reorganization tribunal were concerned, the grievances of the would-be inter-
vener, the trade union, could be handled more expeditiously in another court.
The reorganization sections of the Bankruptcy Act are dedicated to the
adjustment of relations between the debtor, its shareholders and creditors.
Judge Hand construes this as excepting by implication the adjudication of
claims arising between the subsidiary and its own creditors, the subsidiary
not having petitioned for reorganization.8 Therefore, he maintains that even
though the stockholders of the parent may be identical with those of the
subsidiary, nevertheless the'latter's creditors have no interest in the parent's
reorganization, because their rights are against different assets. Judge Hand
believes this interpretation is borne out by the provision requiring a separate
petition to be filed for a subsidiary in order to join it in the reorganization
of its parent.' 0 Such a provision would be unnecessary if the subsidiary's
creditors were already within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy tribunal."
ferred shares of Associated, which are worthless because of Associated's insolvency.
Under the plan, the debt to Postal and other obligations to the system are to be cancelled
in consideration of Commercial's surrender of its various stock holdings, of 38 million
dollars of accounts receivable from affiliated companies, and of 3 millions in cash. The
last item has caused the union the most concern, but it is an extraordinary accumulation
due to the fact that Commercial has been enjoined from paying interest on the debt to
Postal since the beginning of the reorganization proceedings. But by the same token, the
cash reserves of Commercial have been depleted by the non-payment of interest owing to
it by other companies.
With the exceptions above, the assets of Commercial are to be transferred to a new
company, when they will be burdened with 8 million dollars of bonded indebtedness.
7. Cf. In re Northeastern Water Companies, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 653 (N. D. N. Y.
1938).
8. The court did not consider the possibility that Congress might not have the con-
stitutional power to provide for the adjudication of claims between such parties, in view
of the traditional confinement of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the adjustment of claims be-
tween a bankrupt and its creditors.
9. The corporate entities would be disregarded only if it were necessary for the pro-
tection of the rights of innocent parties, or if the subsidiary were a mere adjunct, com-
pletely dominated by its parent. Cf. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S.
307 (1939); Trustees System Co. of Pa. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
10. BANKRUPTCY Acr § 129, 52 STAT. 886 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 529 (Supp. 1938);
cf. §77B(a), 48 STAT. 912 (1934), 11 U. S. C. § 207(a) (1934). See note 12 infra.
11. The majority further demonstrates that while the Act solicitously guards the in-
terests of creditors of the debtor, it makes no provision regarding the interests of others.
The dissent contends in reply that the union may be included within the broad definition
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The court seems to argue that in a situation in which it is unnecessary
for a subsidiary to be a party to the reorganization of the parent, there is
no need to hear objections raised by adversely affected creditors of the sub-
sidiary.12 But in its analysis of the statute, the court fails to utilize two
significant provisions, one relating to intervention, and the other to the feasi-
bility of the plan.
A broad provision of Chapter X, which could be made applicable to this
proceeding,' 3 clearly permits intervention14 to "a party in interest generally
or with respect to any specified matter."'Ir Inquiries into the union's status
as a "creditor" of the debtor or even of the subsidiary could be held irrelevant.
The union may possess legitimate claims against the debtor, even if those
claims are not sufficient to give it creditor status. The debtor Associated
was the sole stockholder of Commercial and might have been enjoined by
any creditor of Commercial from completing a threatened fraudulent with-
drawal of assets. This claim against the debtor should make the union a
of "creditor" of one of the debtors, i.e., "the holder of any claim," BANxnurr- Acr
§ 106(4), 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S. C. § 506(4) (Supp. 1938); it is a "potential"
creditor of the debtor Associated, if its allegations as to an impending fraudulent convey-
ance are true. It would seem, however, that a potential creditor is none at all.
12. But although a separate petition must be filed for the reorganization of the sub-
sidiary, it does" not follow that there is no jurisdiction over a solvent subsidiary for any
purpose. In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 11 F. Supp. 359 (N. D. N. Y. 1935) (sub-
sidiaries of the debtor enjoined from transferring their assets out of the regular course of
business, except after reasonable notice to the court and creditors).
13. See BANKirTvc, Acr §276c(2), 52 STAT. 905 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §676c(2)
(Supp. 1938), which provides that if the petition for reorganization was approved more
than three months before the effective date of the new Act, the provisions of Chapter X
shall apply to the pending proceedings "to the extent that the judge shall deem their
application practicable." See note 27 infra.
14. Compare with § 207, note 15 infra, FEt. R1LEs Civ. Pnoc. 24(a) (3), which, sub-
stantially restating federal practice under old Equity Rule 37, provides an absolute right
to intervene "when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribu-
tion or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof."
The language in Chapter X is permissive, but so was the wording of old Equity Rule 37.
For the view that under some circumstances the right to intervene in a reorganization
proceeding pro interesse sio---e., to protect rights in property in the custody of the
court-should be absolute, see Fx-Ln-rza, TnE LAw oF B; NmUIPTCVt r MOGANIZATz'n:
(1939) 594-599; 2 Mooe's FEDERAL PRLcrxrc (1938) § 24.10; see also Moorz, id. §§ 24.03,
24.09. See note 16 infra.
Pursuing the analogy of intervention pro interesse suo, it would seem that the trade
union in the principal case, if permitted to intervene, would be heard only on the trans-
fer of Commercial's assets, and no more. See note 5 supra; FxIrLrrEn, sunpra, at 596. Yet,
it may be argued that piecemeal examination of the plan would be artificial.
15. BANKRuPTcy Acr § 207, 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 607 (Supp. 1933).
Section 77B(c) (11), 43 STAT. 917 (1934), 11 U. S. C. §207(c)(11) (1934), permits
intervention by creditors and stockholders in a limited number of situations. But a
broad construction of the provision was recommended. Levi and Moore, Federal Inter-
vention (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 565. See Rowvan v. Harburney Oil Co., 91 F. (2d) 122
(C. C. A. 10th, 1937); Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading
C. & I. Co., 99 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
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"party in interest" with respect to the consummation of the plan, and hence
entitled to intervene.
And once the power to allow intervention has been admitted, exercise of
that power in any given case becomes a matter of judicial discretion.'0 Of
course, intervention is a privilege which must be carefully guarded. In each
case it will be necessary to weigh the comparative importance of insuring the
interested parties a hearing, against the policy of keeping down aimless fili-
bustering in order to effect a prompt reorganization. But in the principal
case, it seems that the court should have permitted the trade union to inter-
vene; for a suit instituted by the rejected intervener in another tribunal to
prevent the consummation of the plan could seriously threaten the success
of the reorganization.' 7 The facts in the instant case were such that con-
firmation by the reorganization court could not have the desired finality so
long as the union's claim remained unsettled.18 When interpreted as a device
which should be perfected to obviate the necessity for independent determina-
tions of related issues, the right to intervene or to be heard", in reorgani-
zation cases is in keeping with the spirit of modern procedure, which, as the
dissent points out, "aims to view matters in their entirety, . . . and also
to put an end to litigation as promptly and as completely as possible."
The further provision which merited the attention of the majority was the
requirement, present both in Section 77B and Chapter X, that before con-
firming a plan the judge must be satisfied that it is "feasible." °2 0 The decision
16. See Globe Grain & Mill. Co. v. American Marine Prod. Co., 91 F. (2d) 380 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1937). Reference to "absolute" rights to intervene, note 14 supra, means only
that in certain cases, a denial of permission to intervene would always be considered an
abuse of discretion.
17. In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), note 18 infra.
18. See note 6 supra. In In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936),
the debtor obtained the court's approval to vote its principal asset, all the common stock
in a solvent subsidiary company, towards a sale of the company's assets. A creditor of
the subsidiary moved to have a sizable part of the proceeds of the sale segregated to sat-
isfy an alleged breach of contract, and on denial of its motion, proceeded by attachment
against the subsidiary in a state court. The Second Circuit reversed a restraining order
of the reorganization court, on the ground that the suit was not directed against the
debtor's property. But although the opinion in the Gobel case seems to indicate that the
debtor's plan of reorganization would be fatally delimited as a consequence of the deci-
sion, it is indicated that the progress of the contract of sale was essentially unaffected by
the continuance of the state court proceedings. Appellant's brief in the Gobel case, supra,
pp. 31-33.
19. The Act distinguishes between the right to be heard and the right to intervene,
BANKRUPTCY AcT, §§ 206-208, 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 606-608 (Supp. 1938),
presumably coupling only with the latter the right to take an appeal from an adverse rtl-
ing. See 2 MOOREs'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2404; cf. Teton, Reortqanilaaion Revised
(1939) 48 YALE L. J. 573, 592.
20. Section 221(2) of Chapter X, 52 STAT. 897 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 621(2) (Supp.
1938): ". . . fair and equitable, and feasible"; cf. §77B(f) (1), 48 STAT. 919 (1934),
11 U. S. C. § 207(f) (1) (1934). It might be argued that the court had to hear the
union's objections in order to be satisfied that the Postal plan is "fair," a requirement
bred in an atmosphere of judicial anxiety about fraudulent conveyances. But the anxiety
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in the principal case drives the losing litigants into another forum to enjoin
the consummation of the work of the reorganization proceeding. Under such
circumstances, the fate of the plan is so uncertain that confirmation seems
lacking in an essential finality.2 1
Having interpreted the relevant statutory provisions to its satisfaction, the
majority then examines the power of the reorganization tribunal, sitting as
an equity court, to look past technical deficiencies in the status of the union
as an objecting party.2 2 Here Judge Hand continues to be moved by the
consideration that a reorganization court should confine itself to adjustments
between the debtor, its shareholders and creditors. But he makes several
significant concessions. He expressly acknowledges that on the motion of
a proper party to the proceeding (which, by hypothesis, the association of
Commercial's employees is not), the bankruptcy court could forbid Associated,
debtor under its jurisdiction and sole shareholder of Commercial, from voting
its stock to effect the allegedly fraudulent transfer. Equally significant is the
statement that a bankruptcy judge should not allow a "palpable fraud" to be
consummated before his eyes; "spoliation might be so patent and so gross
that he would be bound to intervene cx mcro motit. The formula which he
suggests, then, reads something like this: where the status of the would-be
intervener is questionable, the court should nevertheless look casually into
the substance of the objection. If it spies "palpable fraud," it will take appro-
priate action on the merits. Thus judicial concern over the possibility of a
fraudulent conveyance as an incident of a reorganization plan manifests itself
in a new light; fraud as to third parties as well as to creditors of the debtor
in reorganization is to be guarded against.2 3 But if, as in the principal case,
spoliation does not clearly appear on the face of the record, the court will
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Technically the merits have not been con-
sidered, and the decision, consequently, is not res judicata.
The fact that the court could forbid Associated to vote its stock to effect
a fraudulent transfer would seem to provide adequate jurisdictional basis for
adjudicating the union's claim. The reorganization court has complete juris-
diction both over the controlling stockholder of the transferor and over
the transferee, the newly-organized corporation which is to receive Com-
mercial's assets. The majority's opinion stresses the fact that no decision is
being made on the merits; and the trade union could at once have pursued
its remedies in another tribunal free from any restraining orders of the reor-
ganization court 2 4 But the new court would unquestionably be influenced
of the courts has traditionally not extended beyond the danger of a fraudulent convey-
ance as to creditors of the debtor. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., CO Sup. Ct.
1 (1939).
21. Cf. Downtoxwna Investment Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., Inc., 81 F. (2d)
314 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
22. That the power of the reorganization court is not a rigid thing, narrowly circum-
scribed by the words of the statute, see Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S. 64S (1935).
23. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 1 (1939); Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
24. Cf. In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., SO F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), note IS supra.
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by the circuit court's findings of no "palpable fraud," and consequently the
union would be unable at any time to obtain a completely unprejudiced hearing
on the merits of its objection. Moreover, if Commercial should become a
contractual party to the plan before the union has instituted a subsequent
suit, it might be argued that Commercial was then within the jurisdiction of
the court, at least for the purpose of protecting the executed arrangement,
and a request for an injunction might well be granted.25 In that case, the
union would receive no opportunity at all to be heard on the merits.
It is hardly necessary to stress the inefficiency and the dangers which follow
from duplication of effort by several tribunals independently acquainting
themselves with the complexities of a corporate network such as that of the
Postal system.26 A subsequent suit by the trade union to enjoin the transfer
of Commercial's assets, if successful, might result in a disintegration of a reor-
ganization plan which had been years in the making.Y Such a suit might be
instituted in the same district court which has considered this case sitting as
a reorganization tribunal, and might on appeal eventually return to the Second
Circuit. The net effect of the so-called jurisdictional ruling must therefore be
either to postpone a decision on the merits or in actuality to decide the merits
without going into them so fully as the facts would seem to warrant.
25. There is some question as to the power of the reorganization court to issue orders
to protect the plan executed under its supervision, if it has failed to reserve jurisdiction
in the final decree for that specific purpose. In re Argyle-Lake Shore Corp., 98 F. (2d)
372 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938). But see In re Hermitage Bldg. Corp., 100 F. (2d) 597, 599
(C. C. A. 7th, 1938); consult 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE (1938) 467. However, the
extensive powers given the court in §262 of the Judicial Code and in §2a(15) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 843 (1938), 11 U.S. C. § lla(15) (Supp. 1938), to issue all
writs, in addition to those specifically provided for, which may be necessary for the proper
exercise of its jurisdiction, would seem to lend adequate sanction to a broader view. C1.
note 22 supra.
26. An alternative would have been to send the record back to be completed. There
was no occasion for the court to be particularly scrupulous about the state of the record,
however, since the appellant, which represented itself as the aggrieved party, was willing
to take its chances on it in the form in which it was sent up on appeal.
27. Postal filed its petition for reorganization under § 77B in 1935, and the plan was
first presented to the court in 1938.
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